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ABSTRACT—Few decisions in American constitutional law have frustrated, 
inspired, and puzzled more than Katzenbach v. Morgan. Justice Brennan’s 
1966 opinion put forth the seemingly radical claim that Congress—through 
its power, based in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to “enforce, by 
appropriate legislation,” the rights enumerated in that Amendment—shared 
responsibility with the Court to define the meaning of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. Although it spawned a cottage industry of scholarship, 
this claim has never been fully embraced by a subsequent Supreme Court 
majority, and in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court rejected the 
heart of the Morgan decision as subversive of the American constitutional 
order. Today, Morgan stands largely as an aberration of American 
constitutional law. 
This Article attempts to place Morgan back into the stream of historical 
development from which it arose. When properly situated in its historical 
context, Justice Brennan’s opinion appears less puzzling and less 
aberrational. Morgan in fact built upon several decades of debates in the 
courts, in Congress, and among legal commentators over the scope of 
congressional enforcement power under Section 5—debates that largely 
have been missing from Section 5 scholarship. In reconstructing the history 
from this period, this Article also identifies the political and legal conditions 
that supported claims of shared constitutional interpretive responsibility in 
the past and considers whether these conditions might again be met in the 
future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress’s role in protecting the rights contained in the Fourteenth 
Amendment is a perennially contentious area of constitutional politics.1 
Congressional responsibility in this area derives from Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to “enforce, by 
appropriate legislation,” the rights guaranteed in the Amendment,2 including 
the first Section’s guarantees of the privileges and immunities of citizenship, 
due process, and equal protection.3 The crux of the issue is whether, in 
exercising its enforcement power, Congress shares responsibility with the 
judiciary for interpreting the meaning of those rights. For at least the last two 
decades, the position of the Supreme Court on this issue has been clear: the 
judiciary is the sole arbiter of the definition of constitutional rights. As the 
 
 1 See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LITIGATION 56–59 (1988), http://www.ialsnet.org/documents/Patersonmaterials2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8FLK-7EMR]; Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 55–57 (2012); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique 
of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, passim (1997).  
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 3 Id. § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
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Court asserted in City of Boerne v. Flores,4 Congress has the power under 
Section 5 to pass legislation to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights, so long 
as these statutory remedies do not expand the court-defined rights. To the 
extent legislation involves preventative measures, they must be “congruen[t] 
and proportional[]” to the scope of any record of constitutional violations by 
the state.5 But to allow Congress shared responsibility in giving meaning to 
the substance of Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court held, would 
undermine the proper functioning of the American constitutional system.6 
The Court has used the Boerne approach to justify striking down 
Congress’s attempts to use Section 5 to expand religious free exercise rights,7 
to provide federal remedies for victims of gender-motivated violence,8 to 
allow individuals to sue states for patent infringement,9 and to allow state 
employees to sue their employers for money damages as a remedy for 
discrimination based on age10 or disability.11 A narrow reading of the 
congressional enforcement power also informed the Court’s ruling in Shelby 
County v. Holder,12 which struck down a core provision of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 as beyond Congress’s authority to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment.13 
Those who are uncomfortable with Boerne’s vision of judicial 
supremacy on questions of constitutional interpretation can find a starkly 
different conception of congressional enforcement power in the 1966 
Supreme Court opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan,14 in which Justice William 
 
 4 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 5 Id. at 520. 
 6 See, e.g., id. at 529 (“If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))). 
 7 Id. 
 8 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act not authorized 
under Section 5). 
 9 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999) (Patent 
Remedy Act not authorized under Section 5). 
 10 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act not 
authorized under Section 5). 
 11 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 not authorized under Section 5); see also Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 566 U.S. 
30, 43–44 (2012) (self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act not authorized under Section 
5). Using the Boerne standard, the Court has also upheld several exercises of Congress’s Section 5 power. 
See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as 
applied to access to courts); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003) (family leave 
provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act). 
 12 570 U.S. 529, 553–57 (2013). 
 13 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation.”). 
 14 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
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Brennan indicated a willingness to share with Congress the responsibility for 
defining the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. But 
while the Morgan decision has served as a foundation for recent efforts to 
recognize the value of constitutional responsibility outside the courts15—and 
the Supreme Court has never overruled it—as a matter of constitutional 
history, the opinion has generally been considered an outlier in the American 
constitutional tradition.16 
By most accounts, Morgan was a brief, singular moment in 
constitutional history, marking the fateful intersection of the Warren Court 
at its ambitious heights and a Congress willing to pass transformative civil 
rights legislation. Scholars have explained away the decision as another of 
Justice Brennan’s clever constitutional sleights of hand.17 It has become a 
precedent of predominantly symbolic value—a suggestive testament to lost 
possibilities for some, a misguided exercise in constitutional impracticalities 
for others, and often simply an object of puzzlement.18 Particularly after 
Boerne and subsequent decisions reiterating Boerne’s dismissal of Morgan,19 
 
 15 See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: 
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 35 (2003) (describing Morgan as 
“paradigmatic” of a Section 5 jurisprudence that “recogniz[es] the distinct constitutional roles of Congress 
and the Court in ways that respected the autonomy of each”). 
 16 See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 
83 (describing Morgan as “embracing an unaccustomed view of congressional relations with the Court 
in defining the substance of equal protection of the laws”); Jesse H. Choper, Congressional Power to 
Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 
299, 303 (1983) (describing Brennan’s opinion as “a bold excursion into largely uncharted territory”). 
 17 See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 263 (2000) 
(“Brennan’s majority opinion was nothing short of a constitutional tour de force, although when one 
reaches its end it is difficult to restate with accuracy how he did it.”). 
 18 Scholarship on Morgan and Section 5 is voluminous. The most comprehensive examination of 
Section 5 jurisprudence is WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2015). Other important 
works include Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79; Burt, supra note 
16; Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan “Power” and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional 
Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819 (1986); Choper, supra note 16; William Cohen, Congressional Power 
to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); David Cole, The Value of 
Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 
1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31; Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971); Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court—1965 Term: Foreword: Constitutional 
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966) [hereinafter Cox, 
Constitutional Adjudication]; Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 
145 (1995); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000); Post & Siegel, supra note 15. 
 19 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2000) (holding that Section 
5 does not authorize Congress “to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court”); see 
also supra notes 8–11 (citing cases applying Boerne’s congruence and proportionality requirement). 
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Justice Brennan’s opinion has become a monument to the Warren Court at 
its visionary—or reckless—heights. 
In this Article I argue that this portrayal of Morgan is misleading and 
that a more complete history provides a better description of the various roles 
Section 5 has played in American constitutionalism. My first and primary 
goal is historical: to explain Justice Brennan’s striking interpretation of 
Section 5 by reconstructing the largely forgotten history of Section 5 in the 
years between Reconstruction and Morgan. My second goal is more 
theoretical and prospective: to draw on this history to identify the conditions 
that have supported or undermined claims of congressional interpretive 
authority. 
The history of Section 5 typically has been told in three parts. It begins 
with the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, the subsequent 
flurry of civil rights laws Congress passed under the Amendment’s Section 
5 authority, and Supreme Court decisions assessing these laws in the 1870s 
and 1880s. The story then jumps to the 1960s and Morgan.20 In this second 
phase of Section 5’s standard history, after decades of being all but forgotten, 
Section 5 was resurrected by a Congress inspired by the demands of the Civil 
Rights Movement, and with the Morgan decision, the Court offered its own 
innovative interpretation of the Section 5 power. In the several decades 
following Morgan, the Court seemed willing to accept, albeit tentatively, 
some level of independent congressional responsibility for defining the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Then, in 1997, Boerne signaled the third stage of 
Section 5’s history. Rejecting Morgan’s recognition of Congress’s 
independent interpretive authority, this decision initiated a period marked by 
bold assertions of judicial interpretive supremacy over the meaning of the 
Constitution and by more stringent judicial oversight of congressional power 
to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
This Article offers a more complete constitutional history of Section 5, 
one that recovers its historical development between Reconstruction and 
Morgan. These are Section 5’s forgotten years. By the time the Court decided 
Morgan, Congress and the Supreme Court had been considering the question 
of overlapping interpretive authority under Section 5 for decades. Beginning 
in the 1940s, congressional power under Section 5 became a pressing issue 
of constitutional politics. To recover this history requires moving beyond 
Supreme Court opinions; only bits and pieces of this discussion made it into 
the Justices’ published opinions in this period. I locate a constellation of 
debates over the congressional enforcement power that took place among 
members of Congress, executive branch lawyers, law professors, and 
 
 20 See, e.g., ARAIZA, supra note 18, at 84–110. 
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members of the Supreme Court as they engaged with one another at oral 
argument, during their private conferences, and in written correspondence. 
The constitutional discourse I piece together shows how a seemingly radical 
and destabilizing proposition—that there might be a gap between 
congressional and judicial understandings of the scope of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights—became commonly assumed and openly supported by 
jurists and lawmakers across the ideological spectrum. Morgan emerges 
from this account not as an exceptional episode of Warren Court creativity, 
but rather as a reflection of commonplace constitutional commitments 
developed over the preceding decades. 
In Part I, I begin the Article with a brief summary of the scholarship on 
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment that historians and legal scholars 
produced in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, in which they sought to revise dominant 
assumptions about the constitutional legacy of Reconstruction. This 
revisionist scholarship provided critical support for advocates of a broad 
enforcement power, particularly those who believed that Congress need not 
necessarily defer to the Court’s interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment 
rights when exercising this power. 
Part II then details a now largely forgotten series of constitutional 
debates on the nature of Section 5 in the decades leading up to Morgan. 
These debates, among a wide array of actors, inside and outside the courts, 
centered on legislative initiatives dealing with federal regulation of lynching, 
poll taxes, and racial discrimination in public accommodations, as well as 
one provocative hypothetical involving federal desegregation of public 
schools. 
In Part III, I turn to the Morgan decision itself, along with the three 
other major decisions involving congressional power to enforce civil rights 
issued during a six-month period in the Supreme Court’s October Term 
1965: South Carolina v. Katzenbach,21 which upheld the sweeping remedial 
requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 under the enforcement 
provision of the Fifteenth Amendment; Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Elections,22 in which the Court struck down the poll tax as a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, while the dissenters indicated that the issue should 
be left to Congress; and United States v. Guest,23 a case interpreting a 
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 in which six Justices agreed that 
the state action limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment did not constrain 
 
 21 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 22 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 23 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
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Congress when acting under Section 5 in the same way it constrained courts 
when interpreting the provisions of Section 1. 
When read against the backdrop of Section 5’s forgotten history, even 
the most far-reaching constitutional implications of Morgan appear less 
aberrational than is commonly assumed. Indeed, I argue that the bolder 
Section 5 reading Justice Brennan offered—the one that recognized 
congressional authority to interpret the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, and the one that Justice Kennedy in Boerne summarily rejected as 
contrary to experience—was, in the context of a more complete history of 
Section 5’s development, quite uncontroversial. If anything, the innovation 
of Morgan is found in Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissenting opinion, in 
which he reconceptualized Section 5 power as a potential threat to judicial 
authority. It is here, in the introduction of separation of powers concerns, that 
we see the emergence of a new approach to Section 5 doctrine, one that 
would culminate in the Boerne decision. 
An examination of this forgotten history not only helps to explain the 
context for the Morgan decision, it also offers insights into Section 5’s role 
in American constitutionalism and the conditions under which judicial 
support for a broad conception of Section 5 power can flourish. This is the 
subject of the final Part of the Article. I offer a theory for why the Supreme 
Court has read Section 5 more broadly at certain times and more narrowly at 
others. Drawing on this theory, I also suggest possible future developments 
that might allow for a revitalization of the Morgan vision of congressional 
interpretative responsibility over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The history I offer in this Article demonstrates the valuable functions a broad 
reading of Section 5 has played—and perhaps may play once again—in the 
American constitutional tradition. 
I. THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 
Among the intellectual foundations for the broad conception of 
congressional power under Section 5 that permeated constitutional debates 
during the decades preceding Morgan was the work of historians and legal 
scholars who sought to revise inherited assumptions about Reconstruction 
and its constitutional legacy. In this Part, I describe how, beginning in the 
1940s, growing numbers of scholars looked to the history of the framing of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, along with subsequent congressional legislation 
and Supreme Court decisions, and argued that this history justified a 
reconsideration of the Section 5 power. In the coming years, Justices, 
lawmakers, and scholars would draw on this revisionist historical 
scholarship in defending a reading of Section 5 under which Congress shared 
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responsibility with the courts in defining the scope of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. 
Prior to the 1940s, the dominant historiography of Reconstruction, 
often associated with the work of Columbia University historian William 
Dunning and his students, emphasized the failures of Reconstruction as a 
program for reform.24 The Dunning School viewed Reconstruction as a tragic 
and misguided historical episode when federal intervention into the South 
and political empowerment of African Americans deepened racial and 
sectional animosities and led to an era of corruption and misgovernment.25 
The post-Civil War constitutional system required that Reconstruction’s 
excesses be cabined, its advocates’ vision of racial equality for the freed 
slaves and punishment for the Confederacy balanced with the needs for 
reconciliation and the federal system.26 While such views remained powerful 
within the legal community well into the post-World War II period, they 
gradually ceded ground to revisionist accounts of the constitutional 
achievement of Reconstruction.27 
In contrast to the Dunning School, revisionist scholarship emphasized 
the ambitious goals of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, including 
their assumption that Congress, under its Section 5 powers, would play a 
leading role in protecting constitutional rights. This historical revisionism 
provided a critical foundation for those who advocated a broad interpretation 
of congressional enforcement power. It featured prominently in discussions 
of Section 5 in the two decades preceding Morgan, and Justice Brennan 
relied on this scholarship in justifying his vision of Section 5 in Morgan. 
Revisionists also drew more sympathetic portraits of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s framers, portraying them not as dangerous ideologues driven 
by an incoherent and reckless egalitarianism, as the Dunning School would 
have it, but as honorable men seeking to give a constitutional foundation to 
the principles of the abolitionist movement.28 Revisionists celebrated the 
framers’ efforts to overhaul the traditional federal structure of government 
 
 24 See, e.g., JOHN W. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1866–1876 (1902); 
WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, 1856–1877 (1907). 
 25 See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 13–14, 115–16 (1999); BURGESS, supra note 24; DUNNING, 
supra note 24. 
 26 See, e.g., CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 22–23 
(1912); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 608 (1926). 
 27 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 
xvii– xxii (Perennial updated ed. 2014) (1988). 
 28 See JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); 
Howard Jay Graham, Our “Declaratory” Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1954). 
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and nationalize the protection of civil rights.29 They further argued that 
central to this liberatory constitutional vision was a commitment to broad 
congressional power to protect constitutional rights—a commitment written 
into the text of the Constitution in the form of the enforcement provisions 
included in each of the Reconstruction Amendments.30 
The case for a broad reading of the Section 5 power, as developed by 
these revisionists in the years following World War II, revolved around three 
pieces of historical evidence. First was the general skepticism the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment held toward the Supreme Court. The framers 
believed that Congress, not the Court, would take the lead in implementing 
the Amendment.31 A central goal of the Fourteenth Amendment, these 
scholars pointed out, was to overturn the Supreme Court’s holding in the 
Dred Scott case32 that Blacks could not be citizens of the United States. 
Members of Congress who drafted and advocated for the Fourteenth 
Amendment “regarded Congress as the primary organ for the 
implementation of the guarantees of privileges and immunities, due process, 
and equal protection,” because they “did not trust the judiciary in general and 
the Supreme Court in particular.”33 
A second piece of historical evidence the post-WWII revisionists 
emphasized was the drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment. In its 
earliest incarnation, the Fourteenth Amendment was framed as entirely a 
grant of power to Congress: “The Congress shall have power to make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each 
State all privileges and immunities . . . , and to all persons in the several 
States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.”34 Critics in 
 
 29 See, e.g., Howard Jay Graham, The Fourteenth Amendment and School Segregation, 3 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (1953) (“That [the Fourteenth Amendment] was adopted and ratified to remove all doubt about 
national power to protect the freedmen and to assure progressive removal of the discriminations, denials 
and abridgments in rights that had been a part of the slave system is generally conceded.”). 
 30 See, e.g., Laurent Frantz, Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 LAW. GUILD REV. 122, 
130 (1949) (“The proponents of civil rights must insist upon a return to the intent of the framers, clearly 
and expressly set down in the text of the [Fourteenth] Amendment itself, that the Amendment is primarily 
a grant of broad new legislative powers to Congress. The possibilities of legislative enforcement are vast 
and untapped.” (footnote omitted)). 
 31 See ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 53–55 (1960); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of 
“Equal Protection of the Laws,” 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 165 (1950); Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional 
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964); Eugene 
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1329–33 (1952). 
 32 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 33 HARRIS, supra note 31, at 53–54. 
 34 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033–34 (1866); see also BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE 
JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 46, 50–51, 61 (1914) (detailing 
drafting history). 
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Congress worried that the proposed amendment, phrased as an express grant 
of power to Congress, granted the federal government excessive control over 
the states.35 The Joint Committee on Reconstruction eventually offered a new 
version of the proposed amendment.36 Their proposal separated the definition 
of the rights in the opening section from the congressional enforcement 
provision in the closing section.37 Generations later, revisionist scholars 
insisted the first version offered a key to identifying the ambitious, Congress-
centered vision of the Fourteenth Amendment held by its framers.38 
The third piece of evidence from the Reconstruction period that the 
revisionists relied upon was the 1880 Supreme Court opinion in Ex parte 
Virginia.39 In this decision, the Court upheld a provision of the Civil Rights 
Act of 187540 that made it a crime to discriminate on racial grounds in jury 
selection. In upholding the indictment of a state judge for violating this 
provision, the majority opinion discussed the congressional enforcement 
power in sweeping terms: 
All of the [Reconstruction] Amendments derive much of their force from [their 
enforcement] provision[s]. It is not said the judicial power of the general 
government shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the 
rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said that branch of the government 
shall be authorized to declare void any action of a State in violation of the 
prohibitions. It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress is 
authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some 
legislation is contemplated to make the amendments fully effective. Whatever 
legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the 
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the 
prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect 
equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial 
or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional 
power.41 
 
 35 HARRIS, supra note 31, at 45–50. 
 36 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866). 
 37 KENDRICK, supra note 34, at 83–84. Republican Representative Giles W. Hotchkiss, who objected 
to the first version of the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized congressional legislation as the primary 
tool for enforcing the Amendment, but he wanted to make sure that the Amendment’s rights would be 
secure even if Congress came under control of Southern “rebels.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1095 (1866); see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 55–57 (1988). 
 38 See, e.g., TENBROEK, supra note 28, at 187–90. 
 39 100 U.S. 339 (1880). 
 40 18 Stat. 335. 
 41 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345–46. 
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This emphasis on judicial deference to a broad congressional enforcement 
power would offer powerful language for later generations interested in 
revitalizing Section 5.42 
Revisionist scholarship regarding the Fourteenth Amendment provided 
a foundation for a strong Section 5 power and for congressional 
responsibility in making the Fourteenth Amendment effective in securing 
civil rights. Postwar revisionism appeared in briefs regularly and in written 
opinions occasionally, and in many instances, revisionist conclusions were 
simply declared as historical truth.43 In Morgan, Justice Brennan included a 
footnote that embraced this revisionist scholarship. He listed three prominent 
works of revisionist historical scholarship that “suggest[ed] that the sponsors 
and supporters of the Amendment were primarily interested in augmenting 
the power of Congress, rather than the judiciary.”44 
Revisionist scholarship on the constitutional and legal achievements of 
Reconstruction offered a valuable historical foundation for postwar judges 
and lawyers who believed Section 5 granted Congress broad authority to give 
meaning to as well as ensure the protection of Section 1 rights. 
II. DEBATING THE CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT POWER 
In this Part, I examine a series of debates in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, 
inside and outside the courts, over the scope of congressional authority to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. I consider debates over federal 
legislation prohibiting lynching, poll taxes, school desegregation, and racial 
discrimination in public accommodations. By resurrecting these now largely 
forgotten debates, I wish to emphasize the prevalence of an operative 
assumption shared by people with diverse ideological and jurisprudential 
commitments: in exercising its Section 5 authority, Congress need not 
necessarily be constrained by the judiciary’s interpretation of Section 1. 
Participants in these overlapping processes of political and judicial 
constitutionalism, who often drew on the revisionist historical scholarship 
 
 42 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 
784 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 
383 U.S. 301, 326–27 (1966); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282–83 (1947); Frantz, supra note 31, at 
1373–75. 
 43 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 34, Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (No. 847) (“Though not expressly 
articulated [in the Thirty-Ninth Congress], it seems clear that the power to enact corrective legislation 
included authority, to be shared with the courts, to determine when there was a departure from the 
principles expressed in Section 1.”). 
 44 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648 n.7 (citing Frantz, supra note 31, at 1356–57; HARRIS, supra note 31, at 
33–56; and TENBROEK, supra note 28, at 187–217). Justice Brennan included a similar historical footnote 
in his opinion in United States v. Guest. 383 U.S. at 783 n.7 (concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing HARRIS, supra note 31, at 53–54; JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 184 (1956); and Frantz, supra note 31, at 1356). I discuss Guest in Section III.C. 
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described above, developed and normalized the idea that the American 
constitutional system allowed for a gap between congressional and judicial 
understandings of the core provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. Anti-Lynching Legislation 
From the late 19th century through the 1960s, there were periodic 
efforts to secure federal legislation that would make lynching a federal 
crime.45 Several anti-lynching bills passed the House, but none made it 
through the Senate. Opponents regularly highlighted what they saw as the 
constitutional infirmities of this kind of federal involvement in local affairs. 
Among their arguments was that the congressional enforcement provision of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the most commonly relied upon basis for anti-
lynching legislation, did not authorize Congress to pass such a law.46 
The constitutional question at issue was whether Congress, in enforcing 
the rights to equal protection and due process, could make private individuals 
criminally liable for taking part in a lynching when state and local law 
enforcement failed to act. This was a question of the “state action” limitation 
on the Fourteenth Amendment, filtered through the Section 5 enforcement 
power. Supporters of federal anti-lynching legislation offered two possible 
bases for federal intervention under Section 5. First, they looked to the 
history of the framing and found evidence that the framers did not intend to 
limit the Amendment just to state actors—or at least that the Amendment did 
not limit congressional authority to regulating state actors when enforcing 
the Amendment’s provisions.47 Second, they argued that states had a 
responsibility under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide equal protection 
of the laws and that, in failing to protect the lives of their black citizens, the 
states were abdicating this responsibility. The requisite state action, 
supporters suggested, could be found in the decision of the state not to act in 
these circumstances—“states are as much responsible for sins of omission as 
 
 45 For a history of anti-lynching legislation focused on the constitutional issues involved, see MILTON 
R. KONVITZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 74–90 (1947). 
 46 Beyond Section 5, other possible constitutional bases for anti-lynching legislation were the 
Commerce Clause, the Guarantee Clause, and the power of Congress to suppress domestic rebellions. 
PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS 107–12 (1947) [hereinafter 
PCCR]; William B. Harvey, Comment, Constitutional Law—Anti-Lynching Legislation, 47 MICH. L. 
REV. 369, 371 n.7 (1949); Federal Power to Prosecute Violence Against Minority Groups, 57 YALE L.J. 
855, 870–71 n.101 (1948). 
 47 See, e.g., ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 39 
(1947) (noting that Congress, during Reconstruction, passed legislation “providing federal protection of 
the rights of individuals against interferences either by public officials or by private individuals”). 
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of commission”48—hence justifying federal intervention under Section 5. As 
the text of one proposed anti-lynching bill explained:  
A State shall be deemed to have denied to any victim or victims of lynching 
equal protection of the laws and due process of law whenever that State or any 
legally competent governmental subdivision thereof shall have failed, 
neglected, or refused to employ the lawful means at its disposal for the 
protection of that person or those persons against lynching or against seizure 
and abduction followed by lynching.49 
Either of these justifications—that the state action doctrine was invalid 
on originalist grounds or that a state’s unwillingness or inability to protect 
certain basic rights could be understood as a form of state action under the 
Fourteenth Amendment—challenged a doctrinal commitment that had been 
generally accepted since the late nineteenth century: that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not apply to private actors.50 Defenders of the state action 
doctrine worried about the consequences of opening the courts to Fourteenth 
Amendment suits against state and local government whenever they failed 
to protect individuals against private rights violations.51 Supporters of federal 
anti-lynching legislation responded to these concerns by arguing that 
congressional authority to regulate private activity under its Section 5 
 
 48 Federal Power to Prosecute Violence Against Minority Groups, supra note 46, at 871. 
 49 H.R. 800, 80th Cong. § 1 (1947); see also Federal Anti-Lynching Act, H.R. 4577, 80th Cong. 
§ 1(a) (1947) (“A State deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law and 
denies him the equal protection of the laws when the State’s inaction has the effect of a discriminatory 
withholding of protection.”). 
 Most proposed anti-lynching bills required a failure of state law enforcement to prosecute perpetrators 
as a trigger for federal intervention. See, e.g., L.C. Dyer & George C. Dyer, The Constitutionality of a 
Federal Anti-Lynching Bill, 13 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 186, 187 (1928) (summarizing the 1928 House proposal 
and noting, “the measure specifically gives the state every opportunity and incentive to deal with the 
menace of mob violence before the Federal authority and power are brought to bear”); Albert E. Pillsbury, 
A Brief Inquiry into a Federal Remedy for Lynching, 15 HARV. L. REV. 707, 708–09 (1902) (summarizing 
1902 proposed legislation in House and Senate); David O. Walter, Proposals for a Federal Anti-Lynching 
Law, 28 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 436, 439 (1934) (summarizing various proposals); William B. Harvey, supra 
note 46, at 370–71 (describing the Wagner-Morse proposal, S. 1352, 80th Cong. (1947)). 
 For law review articles advancing state inaction theory as the basis for Section 5 authority to pass 
anti-lynching legislation, see Federal Power to Prosecute Violence Against Minority Groups, supra note 
46, at 873; Frank & Munro, supra note 31, at 163; Pillsbury, supra, at 710; The Federal Anti-Lynching 
Bill, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 207 (1938); and Comment, State Action and the Enabling Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 44 ILL. L. REV. 199 (1949). 
 50 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“Since the decision of this Court in the Civil 
Rights Cases, the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited 
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of 
the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or 
wrongful.”). 
 51 See, e.g., Charles Wallace Collins, Constitutional Aspects of the Truman Civil Rights Program, 
44 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1949); Frank K. Sloan, Federal Civil Rights Legislation and the Constitution, 1 S.C. 
L.Q. 245 (1949). 
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authority need not require courts to find that private rights violations 
infringed judicially recognized rights in Section 1. In other words, Congress, 
acting under Section 5, might be able to address activities that would not 
necessarily be actionable due process or equal protection claims if brought 
to court. A common working assumption (sometimes articulated explicitly) 
behind Section 5 rationales of anti-lynching laws, therefore, was the idea of 
a Section 1–Section 5 disconnect: the idea that there could be a gap between 
what courts recognized as violations of Section 1 and what Congress 
recognized as violations of Section 1 when exercising its Section 5 
enforcement power.52 
Advocates of federal anti-lynching legislation were working within the 
dominant assumptions of the post-1937 constitutional world, whose first 
premise was that Congress, with the support of the American people, could 
largely define for itself the scope of federal legislative power. “Again and 
again,” explained the widely read 1947 report of the President’s Committee 
on Civil Rights (PCCR), “the Constitution and its clauses have been 
construed to authorize positive governmental programs designed to solve the 
nation’s changing problems.”53 Narrow judicial readings of congressional 
power should not stand in the way of federal policy serving the national 
interest. This assumption, well established by the 1940s in the context of 
economic regulation, was now being drawn upon as the basis for civil rights 
regulation. The general thrust of the constitutional claim, based in a 
recognition of national interest as a guide for congressional authority, would 
be echoed when advocates of other federal civil rights legislation made the 
case for a broad Section 5 authority. 
B. Anti-Poll Tax Legislation 
Beginning in 1939, when Congress debated a bill to prohibit the use of 
poll taxes, advocates offered several possible constitutional bases for such 
legislation.54 When targeted specifically at the payment of a poll tax in 
 
 52 See, e.g., Victor W. Rotnem, The Federal Civil Right “Not to Be Lynched,” 28 WASH. U. L.Q. 57, 
68 (1943). 
 53 PCCR, supra note 46, at 106. President Truman created the President’s Committee on Civil Rights 
in late 1946 as a response to an outbreak of lynchings and other forms of brutality against African 
Americans in the South in the period immediately following the end of World War II. The committee’s 
report, released in late 1947, provided the basis for the civil rights reform agenda Truman ran on in the 
1948 presidential election. See Steven F. Lawson, Introduction: Setting the Agenda of the Civil Rights 
Movement, in TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF HARRY S TRUMAN’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS 1–41 (Steven F. Lawson ed., 2004). 
 54 For an overview of the history of the campaign against the poll tax, see Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer 
Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 71–
79 (2009). This section of my Article is indebted to their excellent work. See also POLITICAL AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 278–88 (Thomas I. Emerson & David Haber eds., 1952) (describing 
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federal elections, proponents generally relied upon Congress’s power to 
regulate the “times, places, and manner” of congressional elections.55 But 
alongside this Article I authority, proponents of anti-poll tax legislation in 
federal elections also pointed to the enforcement clauses of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. And when they turned to the poll tax in state 
elections, the enforcement clauses were the primary bases for legislative 
proposals.56 While the Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement provision at first 
blush might seem the most promising basis for federal anti-poll tax 
legislation, this Amendment was explicitly limited to protecting against 
racial discrimination in the franchise.57 Those campaigning against the poll 
tax recognized that the poll tax was a central tool of Jim Crow, but they 
envisioned a broader, cross-racial movement against poll taxes. They thus 
turned to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, resting on the broader 
foundation of Section 1’s protections, as the necessary foundation for federal 
action.58 But the Supreme Court had considered a Fourteenth Amendment 
challenge to the poll tax in the 1937 case Breedlove v. Suttles59 and, in a brief, 
unanimous opinion, had declared the poll tax did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.60 Therefore, advocates for a federal law advanced the idea that, 
in exercising its Section 5 power, Congress could go beyond the Court’s 
definition of what constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.61 
 
constitutional issues relating to anti-poll tax legislation); Janice E. Christensen, The Constitutionality of 
Anti-Poll Tax Bills, 33 MINN. L. REV. 217 (1949) (same); Joseph E. Kallenbach, Constitutional Aspects 
of Federal Anti-Poll Tax Legislation, 45 MICH. L. REV. 717 (1947) (same). 
 55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. By the 1940s, there was a long line of judicial precedent recognizing broad 
congressional authority under its Article I powers to regulate state and local affairs that interfered with 
the right to vote in federal elections. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); United States v. 
Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 
(1879). 
 56 The second most commonly referenced basis for regulating the poll tax in state elections was the 
Guarantee Clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican form of government . . . .”); see, e.g., Louis B. Boudin, State Poll Taxes and the 
Federal Constitution, 28 VA. L. REV. 1, 5–9 (1941); Christensen, supra note 54, at 243–45; Monroe R. 
Lazere, Note, Payment of Poll Tax as a Prerequisite to Voting in a Federal Election, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 
104, 109–10 (1942). 
 57 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”). 
 58 See, e.g., Kallenbach, supra note 54, at 723–24. 
 59 302 U.S. 277 (1937). 
 60 Id. at 281 (noting that the poll tax has a long history in the United States). 
 61 See, e.g., Kallenbach, supra note 54, at 723–24 (“Supreme Court pronouncements sustaining state 
poll tax payment requirements in the face of attacks on constitutional grounds are not in point on the 
validity of the proposed anti-poll tax statute. These pronouncements merely establish the proposition that 
the Court does not feel impelled to nullify such requirements solely on the basis of existing constitutional 
guarantees in the absence of an expression of Congressional view regarding their propriety.”). 
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By the 1940s, judicial deference to broad congressional power was 
widely accepted as the framework from which to consider possible poll tax 
legislation—regardless of whether the Court was willing to find the practice 
itself a violation of the Constitution. “A finding by the Court that a federal 
anti-poll tax statute lies within the range of Congressional power would fit 
easily into this pattern of recent judicial decisions of a nationalizing 
character,” summarized one assessment.62 The 1947 PCCR report called for 
the abolition of the poll tax,63 and Truman’s subsequent push for 
comprehensive civil rights reform included a bill prohibiting the poll tax in 
federal elections, which was passed by the House but blocked in the Senate.64 
Push for federal regulation of the poll tax gained momentum in the 
1960s. In 1964, the nation ratified the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which 
prohibited the poll tax in all federal elections. This prohibition, limited as it 
was to federal elections, would seem to have been well within the powers of 
Congress to make through the legislative process.65 Civil rights groups 
actually opposed the Amendment out of concern that it would inhibit future 
efforts at civil rights legislation by setting a precedent that major civil rights 
reform required the laborious processes of an Article V amendment.66 
This concern materialized when Congress considered including a 
provision outlawing poll taxes in state elections (by this point only four states 
in the South maintained the practice) in the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The 
recent passage of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment led some to argue that the 
state poll tax could not be prohibited through the legislative process, and that 
nothing less than a constitutional amendment was required.67 This line of 
argument was picked up not only by Southern opponents of anti-poll tax 
legislation, but also by the Johnson Administration.68 Johnson initially 
favored a legislative poll tax prohibition, but Attorney General Nicholas 
 
 62 Kallenbach, supra note 54, at 727 (citing Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and United 
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)). 
 63 PCCR, supra note 46, at 160. 
 64 See Poll Tax: Hearings on H.R. 29 Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 80th Cong. (1948); 
Anti-Poll-Tax Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 29 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the H. Comm. 
on H. Admin., 80th Cong. (1947); Christensen, supra note 54. 
 65 The passage of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in Congress was largely the product of the efforts 
of Spessard Holland, a segregationist senator from Florida who opposed the major federal civil rights 
legislation of the 1960s. He insisted that the target of the Amendment was wealth classifications, not 
racial ones. On Spessard’s curious story and the history of the passage of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 
see generally Ackerman & Nou, supra note 54, at 69–87. 
 66 Id. at 70, 82–84. 
 67 Id. at 88–98. 
 68 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27 n.25, Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663 (1966) (No. 48) (describing Justice Department’s concerns); Ackerman & Nou, supra note 54, at 89–
93, 98–99 (same); Cox, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 18, at 96 n.37 (same). 
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Katzenbach convinced him not to press for this. “[B]ecause the 
constitutionality of the poll tax was already in the courts,” Katzenbach later 
explained, “and I was quite confident that the Supreme Court would find it 
an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote,” he saw no need for Congress 
to take on the issue.69 “If the law contained a prohibition, I thought the Court 
might postpone its decision until the legislative ban was before it, which 
could delay a decision a couple of years.”70 
Despite opposition from the Johnson Administration, congressional 
liberals continued to support an anti-poll tax provision. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee voted in support of the provision, favoring the supportive 
assessments they received from various legal scholars over Katzenbach’s 
warnings.71 As reported in the New York Times:  
Fears that a poll tax might lead to a court upset of the whole law have been 
effectively rebutted by such distinguished constitutional scholars as Profs. Paul 
A. Freund and Mark De Wolf Howe of the Harvard Law School. They assert 
that the courts would actually welcome a Congressional declaration of policy 
and judgment in this marginal area.72 
Professor Freund wrote a particularly influential letter to Senator 
Edward Kennedy offering his opinion that the Court would uphold a 
congressional prohibition of the poll tax.73 In a letter to the New York Times, 
Kennedy cited Professor Freund in explaining his support of the poll tax 
provision.74 
While congressional liberals supported a legislative prohibition on all 
poll taxes,75 opponents, strengthened by the counsel of the Attorney General, 
blocked these proposals.76 The end result was a compromise. Section 10 of 
the Voting Rights Act declared that Congress was of the opinion that the 
state poll tax violated the Fourteenth Amendment and commanded the 
 
 69 NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, SOME OF IT WAS FUN: WORKING WITH RFK AND LBJ 173 (2008). 
 70 Id. On the potential impact of a congressional prohibition on the poll tax on the pending litigation, 
Katzenbach said in congressional hearings on the voting rights bill:  
I do not think anything that Congress says under the power of the 14th amendment helps very much. 
That is a congressional judgment that it violates the 14th amendment is no better, in fact not quite 
as good, as a judgment by the Supreme Court that it violates the 14th amendment.  
Voting Rights Legislation: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 95 
(1965) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 71  S. REP. NO. 89-162 pt. 3, at 35 (1965) (“[A] decision on the poll tax in the absence of congressional 
action is not relevant to the issue of congressional power to act.”). 
 72 Race and the Poll Tax, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1965, at E10. 
 73 Letter from Paul A. Freund to Sen. Robert F. Kennedy (May 17, 1965), reprinted in 111 CONG. 
REC. 11,062 (1965). 
 74 Edward M. Kennedy, Letter to the Editor, Poll-Tax Ban Sought, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1965, at 32. 
 75 Ackerman & Nou, supra note 54, at 99–100. 
 76 Id. at 100–04. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
64 
Department of Justice to pursue litigation on this question.77 The issue was 
thus left to the Supreme Court for final determination. In Harper v. Virginia 
Board of Elections,78 the Court would eventually strike down the poll tax.79 
Although neither anti-lynching legislation nor anti-poll tax legislation 
ever got the votes to pass Congress, debates surrounding these proposed 
pieces of legislation provided an opportunity for lawmakers and legal 
commentators to explore the scope of congressional authority under Section 
5. Supporters often defended the constitutionality of these bills by insisting 
that Section 5 gave Congress the authority to protect constitutional rights 
beyond those recognized by the courts. Because these bills never passed, the 
Supreme Court never had an opportunity to join in these constitutional 
debates. The next debate I examine brings the Justices into the story. 
C. School Desegregation Legislation (Before Brown) 
One of the most remarkable discussions about the scope of 
congressional power under Section 5 in the decades preceding Morgan came 
during the Supreme Court’s deliberations over the constitutionality of school 
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education.80 In the early 1950s, as the 
Court moved toward its decision in Brown, several of the Justices expressed 
an interest in the possibility of congressional, rather than judicial, leadership 
in declaring segregated schools a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Despite the fact that everyone knew Congress was nowhere near passing 
such a law, the issue arose repeatedly during oral arguments. The most 
striking aspect of all was the assumption, openly embraced by several 
Justices, that Congress had the power under Section 5 to overrule Plessy v. 
Ferguson81 and thereby desegregate the nation’s schools. 
By the early 1950s, practically all the Justices recognized that 
segregated schools were morally abhorrent, pervasively discriminatory, and 
damaging to the nation’s national security interest in the Cold War struggle 
for the loyalties of people of color around the world.82 At the same time, a 
number of the Justices questioned whether the Supreme Court should lead 
 
 77 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 10, 79 Stat. 442–43 (codified at 52 U.S.C. 
§ 10306(a)–(b) (2012)). 
 78 383 U.S. 663, 664–66 (1966). 
 79 See infra Section III.B. 
 80 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 81 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 82 See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (2000) (describing how Cold War diplomacy concerns bolstered support for civil rights); 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (describing growing support for civil rights in American society and 
politics in the 1940s and 1950s). 
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the charge on this issue by reinterpreting the Equal Protection Clause and 
overruling Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine. Considering the Southern 
stranglehold on the levers of power in Congress, particularly in the Senate, 
and the (at best) divided support for school desegregation among the national 
populace, these discussions about the possibility of congressional action 
were ultimately little more than theoretical.83 Recent sessions of Congress 
were unable to pass far less transformative civil rights legislation (such as an 
anti-lynching bill).84 Congress was not even close to desegregating schools. 
The Justices all knew this; the lawyers knew this. 
Yet, reflecting their concerns with protecting the institutional 
legitimacy of the Court, several Justices wanted to make clear that they 
would rather have Congress take responsibility for this issue, thereby 
removing the growing pressure on the Court to act. As Justice Jackson 
observed to the NAACP lawyers during oral arguments: “I suppose that 
realistically the reason this case is here was that action couldn’t be obtained 
from Congress.”85 In an unpublished draft concurrence in Brown, Justice 
Jackson bluntly stated: “We are urged, however, to supply means to 
supervise transition of the country from segregated to nonsegregated schools 
upon the basis that Congress may or probably will refuse to act. That assumes 
nothing less than that we must act because our representative system has 
failed.”86 For Justice Jackson, the Court was being forced to decide this 
pressing national issue because of a breakdown of the political process. 
During oral arguments, Justice Jackson spun out his congressional 
hypothetical—including its basis in Section 5—in more detail: “Suppose 
Congress should enact a statute, pursuant to the enabling clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which nobody seems to attach any importance to 
here, as far as I have heard, that segregation was contrary to national policy, 
to the national welfare, and so on, what would happen?”87 The Court’s 
questions to the litigants in calling for reargument of the case in 1953 also 
reflected its interest in the possibility of congressional action. The Court 
asked the litigants to prepare arguments addressing a number of issues, 
 
 83 Although Southerners did not hold numerical majorities in Congress, they held a disproportionate 
number of leadership positions, which gave them considerable power over the legislative process. See 
Michael J. Klarman, Court, Congress, and Civil Rights, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 178–80 
(Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005). 
 84 See POWE, supra note 17, at 47. 
 85 ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952–55, at 244 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969). 
 86 Robert H. Jackson, Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson 17 (Mar. 15, 1954) (Robert H. Jackson 
Papers, Box 184, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Jackson 
Memorandum]. 
 87 ARGUMENT, supra note 85, at 93. 
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including the question of whether “future Congresses might, in the exercise 
of their power under section 5 of the Amendment, abolish” school 
segregation, even if such an action might conflict with the original 
understanding of the Amendment.88 
The Justices on the Brown Court were well aware of the history of the 
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, as this was a central issue in their 
evaluation of the school desegregation cases. Alexander Bickel, in his history 
of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment—initially prepared during his 
clerkship for Justice Frankfurter in October Term 1952—concluded that the 
framers intentionally left the precise scope of the Amendment’s objectives 
“open, to be decided another day.”89 With respect to the original 
understanding of Section 5, Bickel concluded, “Such expectations as the 
Radicals had were centered quite clearly on legislative action. . . . Most 
probably they had little hope that the Court would play a role in furthering 
their long-range objectives.”90 Thus, those most responsible for drafting the 
Amendment anticipated that Congress, not the Court, would make necessary 
“future determination[s]” of its coverage.91 
In conference, Justice Black also expressed his preference for 
congressional action.92 He went on to accept, however, that the situation had 
changed, that “the courts have taken jurisdiction” over the question, and that 
the protections of the Equal Protection Clause should be considered as a 
“self-executing agreement.”93 Chief Justice Vinson, who failed to stake out 
a clear position on school segregation as a Section 1 issue prior to his death 
 
 88 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953). The Court followed this question about 
congressional power with a question about whether “it [is] within the judicial power, in construing the 
Amendment, to abolish segregation in public schools?” Id. Frankfurter’s initial draft of this question was 
even more explicit in theorizing the relationship between Section 5 and Section 1: “[A]ssuming further 
that it was the understanding of the Framers that Congress might, in the exercise of its powers under § 5, 
act to apply the Amendment so as to abolish primary school segregation, does a judicial power to do so 
exist concurrently with that of Congress?” Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum for the Conference: Re: The 
Segregation Cases (May 27, 1953) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at 
Austin, Box A27). 
 89 Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decisions, 69 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 63 (1955). 
 90 Id. at 64. 
 91 Id. 
 92 THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985), at 648 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter 
IN CONFERENCE] (“If we had decided this case right after passage of the Civil War Amendments, I believe 
that we would have held originally that the way to enforce this was through Congress.”); see also id. (“I 
don’t think that Congress went as far as they thought the Civil War Amendments went.”). 
 93 Id. 
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in 1953, had no doubts that Congress had the power to desegregate schools 
and that he would prefer for Congress to do so.94 
During the Brown litigation, the Justices’ enthusiasm for congressional 
initiative posed tactical difficulties for the lawyers. Consider, for instance, 
when Justice Jackson pressed the attorney defending the segregation policy 
of Virginia’s Prince Edward County School Board on this possibility. The 
lawyer responded that such action would require a constitutional amendment 
and, if passed as a statute alone, the Court should strike it down.95 The 
segregationist lawyer’s point actually received some support from opposing 
counsel, because those challenging segregated schools feared that 
recognizing a role for Congress here might take pressure off the Court to 
overrule Plessy. Thus, Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin (arguing for the Court 
to strike down segregation in schools) said in response to Jackson’s question: 
“[T]he whole concept of constitutional law is that those rights that are 
defined and set out in the Constitution are not to be subject to the political 
form which changes from time to time, but are to be preserved under the 
holdings of this Court over many, many years by the orders of this Court 
granting the relief prayed for.”96 Similarly, the NAACP brief, submitted in 
response to the Court’s reargument order, emphasized the framers’ 
recognition of the self-enforcing nature of Fourteenth Amendment rights.97 
NAACP counsel Spottswood Robinson took a slightly different approach, 
recognizing that Congress had power under Section 5 to prohibit segregated 
schooling but then contending that congressional inaction should not prevent 
the Court from taking the initiative.98 
 
 94 Id. at 647 (“As to having mixed school classes, I think that Congress has the power to act for the 
District of Columbia and for the states. . . . I don’t think much of the idea that it is for Congress and not 
for us to act. If they do not act, this leaves us with it. It would be better if Congress would act. Congress 
may act for the District of Columbia, but probably will not act for the states.” (footnote omitted)). 
 95 ARGUMENT, supra note 85, at 93. 
 96 Id. at 244. 
 97 Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument at 19, Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5) (“While the Amendment conferred upon Congress 
the power to enforce its prohibitions, members of the 39th Congress and those of subsequent Congresses 
made it clear that the framers understood and intended that the Fourteenth Amendment was self-executing 
and particularly pointed out that the federal judiciary had authority to enforce its prohibitions without 
Congressional implementation.”); id. at 124–25 (“[T]he judicial power to enforce the prohibitory effect 
of section 1 was not made dependent upon Congressional action. . . . To now hold Congressional action 
a condition precedent to judicial action would be to stultify the provisions in the Federal Constitution 
protecting the rights of minorities. In effect, this Court would be holding that action by a state against an 
unpopular minority which the Constitution prohibits cannot be judicially restrained unless the unpopular 
minority convinces a large majority (the whole country as represented in Congress) that a forum in which 
to ask relief should be provided for the precise protection they seek.”). 
 98 ARGUMENT, supra note 85, at 101–02. 
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There were also some breaks in the ranks among the lawyers defending 
segregation. While most echoed the Virginia lawyer’s argument that 
Congress lacked the power to desegregate schools, the lawyer representing 
Kansas offered a variation on the Section 1–Section 5 gap theory in arguing 
that, while the Court did not have the constitutional authority, Congress did.99 
The Kansas attorney argued that while there remained an important role for 
the Court in enforcing the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, “when 
it is sought to extend the federal jurisdiction into those undefined areas on 
the periphery of equal protection, we believe the framers intended that the 
Congress and not the courts should supply the impetus.”100 Kansas officials 
were never as enthusiastic about defending their segregation policy as their 
counterparts from the other states involved in the Brown litigation. In fact, 
the state had abandoned its school segregation policy while Brown was still 
being argued.101 The Kansas Attorney General’s focus on the need for 
congressional initiative, and the value of allowing a Section 1–Section 5 
disconnect when confronting “those undefined areas on the periphery of 
equal protection,” was an effort to carve out a more moderate defense of 
states’ rights, one that distinguished federal judicial action from 
congressional action. 
The assumption behind the Justices’ questions—that Congress had the 
power to desegregate schools under its Section 5 powers, even if the Court 
had not yet explicitly overruled Plessy—resonated not only within the Court 
but also among many of the leading legal scholars of the day. As the Court 
neared its decision in Brown, Professor Paul Freund of Harvard Law School 
made explicit the point that would have been obvious to any observer of the 
oral arguments in the case: “Whatever may be the outcome of the present 
cases on segregation in the public schools, it is scarcely to be doubted that if 
Congress itself were to pronounce the doom of segregated primary education 
in the public schools the mandate would be cheerfully accepted by the 
Supreme Court.”102 Several years after the decision, Professor Freund 
suggested that “[t]he court might . . . have treated the [desegregation] issue 
as a ‘political question,’ to be determined by Congress under its specific 
power to legislate in order to carry out the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”103 In the hand-wringing that followed the decision by those 
 
 99 Brief for the State of Kansas on Reargument at 49, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (No. 1) (“If, in spite of 
evidence to the contrary, it be conceived that the equal protection clause does provide for the abolition of 
segregation in the public schools, then Congress must so indicate by an exercise of its power under section 
5.”). 
 100 Id. at 50. 
 101 Id. at 14. 
 102 Paul A. Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 564 (1954). 
 103 Paul A. Freund, Storm over the American Supreme Court, 21 MOD. L. REV. 345, 351 (1958). 
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who opposed segregated education but struggled to locate an adequate legal 
rationale for Brown, the possibility of congressional, rather than judicial, 
leadership remained prominent. In his much-noted Harvard Law School 
lectures in which he confessed his discomfort with the reasoning the Court 
offered in Brown, Judge Learned Hand noted: “It is curious that no mention 
was made of section [five], which offered an escape, from intervening, for it 
empowers Congress to ‘enforce’ all the preceding sanctions by ‘appropriate 
legislation.’”104 In his equally noteworthy lectures delivered the following 
year, with much the same uncertainty about the principle behind the Brown 
ruling, Columbia Law School Professor Herbert Wechsler observed that 
having the Court “remit the issue to the Congress, acting under the 
enforcement clause of the [fourteenth] amendment” was “a possible solution, 
to be sure.”105 
In short, the under-examined assumption of the Brown Court was that 
a gap between Section 5 and Section 1 could exist, with two possible 
consequences for the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. One possibility 
was that the Court would recognize and accept this gap, perhaps under a kind 
of “necessary and proper” reading of Section 5. For example, Justice 
Frankfurter noted in oral argument that the intentions of the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment might be different when focused on Section 5 versus 
Section 1: 
[P]atently Congress looked forward to implementing legislation; implementing 
legislation patently looked forward to the future, and if Congress passed a 
statute doing that which is asked of us to be done through judicial decree, the 
case would come here with a pronouncement by Congress in its legislative 
capacity that in its view of its powers, this was within the Fourteenth 
Amendment and, therefore, it would come with all the heavy authority, with the 
momentum and validity that a congressional enactment has.106 
Justice Frankfurter later added: “The Fourteenth Amendment is not unlike, 
in some aspect, the commerce clause. There are many things that the states 
cannot do merely because the commerce clause exists. There are many things 
that a state can do until Congress steps in.”107 
The other—and more likely—possibility was that the Court would 
follow Congress in redefining the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
 104 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 55 (1958). 
 105 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32 
(1959). 
 106 ARGUMENT, supra note 85, at 94. 
 107 Id. at 103; see also id. (reporting a question by Justice Reed: “But if segregation is not a denial of 
equal protection or due process, legislation by Congress could do nothing more except to express 
congressional views, and wouldn’t that be decisive?”). 
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In other words, the Court would adopt the congressional interpretation of 
equal protection as a self-enforcing constitutional right.108 This was the 
approach that Justice Jackson seemed to favor, as evident in his unpublished 
draft concurrence in Brown.109 
Justice Jackson’s discussion of this Court–Congress collaborative 
model of Fourteenth Amendment law echoed arguments he had put forth 
seven years earlier in a 1947 opinion involving a Fourteenth Amendment 
challenge to the New York jury system. Justice Jackson’s opinion for the 
Court in Fay v. New York rejected an equal protection challenge to the New 
York selection process for its juries, which had the effect of limiting 
representation by certain working-class professions and women.110 In 
refusing to place these discriminatory practices on the same level as racial 
discrimination in jury selection, Justice Jackson relied not only on judicial 
precedent,111 but also on congressional views as expressed in its Section 5 
legislation.112 Although Justice Jackson recognized that the Court had the 
power and the responsibility to strike down state legislation that violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment even in the absence of congressional action, he 
insisted any expansion of the scope of equal protection in these 
circumstances required “exacting requirements” demonstrating the 
constitutional violation.113 In this case, the Court’s “only source of power or 
guidance . . . is found in the cryptic words of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
 
 108 For a loosely analogous earlier episode, consider the progression from United States v. Classic, 
313 U.S. 299 (1941) (recognizing congressional power to regulate primary elections) to Smith v. 
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664–66 (1944) (applying Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment to primary 
elections). See Smith, 321 U.S. at 660 (“The fusing by the Classic case of the primary and general 
elections into a single instrumentality for choice of officers has a definite bearing on the permissibility 
under the Constitution of excluding Negroes from primaries.”). 
 109 Jackson Memorandum, supra note 86, at 11 (noting that through Section 5, the Amendment 
“makes provision for giving effect from time to time to the changes of conditions and public opinion 
always to be anticipated in a developing society. A policy which it outlines only comprehensively it 
authorized Congress to complete in detail”). 
 110 See 332 U.S. 261, 270 (1947). 
 111 One part of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that survived The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), 
was a provision prohibiting racial discrimination in jury selection. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 
349 (1880) (upholding Section 4 of the 1875 Civil Rights Act). 
 112 By using its Section 5 power to single out racial discrimination as a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Justice Jackson explained, “Congress has put [racial discrimination] cases in a class by 
themselves.” Fay, 332 U.S. at 282. Jackson would further elaborate: 
For us the majestic generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment are thus reduced to a concrete 
statutory command when cases involve race or color which is wanting in every other case of alleged 
discrimination. This statute was a factor so decisive in establishing the Negro case precedents that 
the Court even hinted that there might be no judicial power to intervene except in matters authorized 
by Acts of Congress. 
Id. at 282–83. 
 113 Id. at 283–84. 
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unaided by any word from Congress or any governing precedent in this 
Court.”114 This, for Justice Jackson, was not enough.115 
Justice Jackson’s assumption in Fay that congressional Section 5 
legislation could potentially change the landscape of the Court’s equal 
protection analysis carried over to his evaluation of Brown. With regard to 
segregation and education, Justice Jackson explained in his unpublished 
Brown concurrence: 
[T]here can be no doubt that [the Amendment] gives Congress a wide discretion 
to enact legislation on that subject binding on all states and school districts. 
Admittedly, it explicitly enables Congress from time to time to exercise a wide 
discretion as to new laws to meet new conditions. The question is how far this 
Court should leave this subject to be dealt with by legislation, and any answer 
will have far-reaching implications.116 
Justice Jackson’s understanding of the scope of Section 5 was closely related 
to his skepticism about the efficacy of judicial action unaccompanied by the 
active support of the political branches.117 Justice Jackson believed that “[a] 
 
 114 Id. at 285. 
 115 In dissent in Fay, Justice Murphy took aim at Justice Jackson’s reliance on congressional inaction 
as a basis for judicial rejection of the equal protection claim. “[L]egislation by Congress prohibiting the 
particular kind of inequality here involved is unnecessary to enable us to strike it down under the 
Constitution. . . . [Congress’s] failure to legislate as to economic or other discrimination in jury selection 
does not permit us to stand idly by.” Id. at 297 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 116 Jackson Memorandum, supra note 86, at 11. On this point, Justice Jackson’s clerk, E. Barrett 
Prettyman, took issue:  
I think Congress has no constitutional power to act in this field of state public education. You say 
that Congress may act if the 14th Amendment “deals with” segregation. There are two objections 
to this. (1) This Court has held until this decision that segregation per se is not invalid under the 
Amendment. You could hardly expect Congress to abolish segregation, citing the Amendment as 
its source of power, in the face of this Court’s holding that the Amendment does not prohibit it. (2) 
More importantly, no matter what the Court has held or will hold about segregation and the 14th 
Amendment, that holding is not a grant of power to Congress. This is not the Commerce Clause, 
but an Amendment limiting the states. . . . The whole discussion about the constitutionality of a 
federal anti-lynching bill revolves around this very point.  
Memorandum from E. Barrett Prettyman Jr., Law Clerk to Justice Jackson, to Justice Robert H. Jackson, 
Re. Nos. 1-4 at 5 (c. Mar. 1954) (Jackson Papers, Container 184). Prettyman went on to engage with the 
issue of institutional competence:  
Furthermore, even if Congress had power in the field, I am not sure that the precise question before 
the Court is one which could or should be delegated to the legislative branch. . . . [T]he question of 
whether Negroes have advanced so far that the mere fact of separation denies them equal protection 
seems to me to be a legal one.  
Id. at 5–6. 
 117 Jackson Memorandum, supra note 86, at 12 (“[I]n embarking upon a widespread reform of social 
custom and habits of countless communities we must face the limitations on the nature and effectiveness 
of the judicial process.”). Justice Jackson distinguished between the Court striking down individual state 
support of educational segregation and Congress legislating a nationwide ban of it. Id. at 13–14 (“The 
Court can strike down legislation which supports educational segregation, but any constructive policy for 
abolishing it must come from Congress. Only Congress can enact a policy binding on all states and 
districts . . . .”). 
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Court decision striking down state statutes or constitutional provisions which 
authorize or require segregation will not produce a social transition, nor is 
the judiciary the agency to which the people should look for that result.”118 
His concerns with questions of pragmatic policymaking and his belief 
that Congress was better positioned to create effective change led Justice 
Jackson to envision a constitutional system in which Congress had broad 
latitude to interpret and refine Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
After Brown came down, critics of the decision frequently pointed to 
Section 5 as a basis for claiming that the issue should have been dealt with 
by Congress, not the Court. For example, the Southern Manifesto—the 1956 
statement denouncing Brown, signed by nearly all Southern members of 
Congress—attacked the decision as “climax[ing] a trend in the Federal 
Judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress, 
and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and the people.”119 The 
Manifesto also stated:  
Though there has been no constitutional amendment or act of Congress 
changing this established legal principle almost a century old, the Supreme 
Court of the United States, with no legal basis for such action, undertook to 
exercise their naked judicial power and substituted their personal political and 
social ideas for the established law of the land.120 
Defenders of Brown countered that while the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment assumed a more powerful role for Congress, historical 
experience had demonstrated the need for judicial leadership to protect 
 
 118 Id. at 14. Justice Jackson suggested that “a considerable part of the inertia of Congress, if not the 
country, has been due to the belief that the existing system is constitutional”—a belief stemming from 
“the deference habitually paid by other branches of the Government to this Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution.” Id. at 18. 
 119 The Decision of the Supreme Court in the School Cases—Declaration of Constitutional Principles 
[the “Southern Manifesto”], 102 CONG. REC. 4460 (1956) (emphasis added). 
 120 Id. (emphasis added); see also Eugene Cook & William I. Potter, The School Segregation Cases: 
Opposing the Opinion of the Supreme Court, 42 A.B.A. J. 313, 317 (1956) (describing the Court in Brown 
II, and its ruling providing guidelines for implementing school desegregation, as “usurping the 
prerogatives of the United States Congress” because “the Fourteenth Amendment itself vests in Congress 
the power of implementation” and Congress “has refused to interpret that amendment as compelling the 
commingling of the races in mixed schools against the wishes of the people”); Charles Fairman, The 
Supreme Court 1955 Term—Foreword: The Attack on the Segregation Cases, 70 HARV. L. REV. 83, 85 
(1956) (“[B]y section 5 of [the Fourteenth Amendment], . . . the people expressly reserved to themselves, 
through their representatives in Congress, the right to determine how it should be implemented.” (quoting 
S.J. Res. 137, 84th Cong. (1956), and H.R.J. Res. 571, 84th Cong. (1956))); Ray Forrester, The Supreme 
Court and the Rule of Law, 4 S. TEX. L.J. 107, 119 (1959) (stating “there is no question of [Congress’s] 
power” to “take action in the field covered by the segregation cases”); R. Carter Pittman, The Law of the 
Land, 6 J. PUB. L. 444, 454 (1957) (accusing the Brown Court of “usurp[ing] . . . from the Congress the 
power to enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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constitutional rights.121 The position embraced by these defenders of Brown 
has largely won the day. Brown has come to symbolize the value, even the 
necessity, of judicial leadership in protecting civil rights. But as the 
preceding history of Section 5 and Brown demonstrates, a commitment to 
this position has been in some tension with a robust vision of congressional 
power under Section 5. 
D. Public Accommodations Legislation 
Unlike the debates over the scope of congressional authority under 
Section 5 in the context of anti-lynching or anti-poll tax legislation, which 
involved proposed legislation that never got through Congress, or in the 
context of school desegregation legislation, which never left the realm of the 
hypothetical, the debate detailed in this Section involved legislation that 
Congress passed and the Supreme Court then reviewed. The debate over the 
prohibition of racial discrimination in public accommodations that led to the 
passage of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act involved contestation over 
the scope of congressional authority under Section 5 that took place in 
Congress and then in the Court. As with the debates discussed above, 
participants in this debate often recognized the possibility of an interpretive 
gap between Section 1 and Section 5. In this case, the gap theory would mean 
that the Court could recognize that Congress had authority under Section 5 
to prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations regardless of 
whether the Court, when interpreting Section 1, recognized 
nondiscriminatory access to public accommodations as a Fourteenth 
Amendment right.122 
1. The Debate in Congress 
By early 1963, the demands of civil rights protesters for 
nondiscriminatory access to restaurants, hotels, and other public 
accommodations were resonating across the nation, including in the halls of 
 
 121 In defending Brown, Harvard Law Professor Charles Fairman offered a ringing endorsement of 
the judiciary as the protector of constitutional principles: 
As our experience with the fourteenth amendment has unfolded it has been the Court to which the 
country has looked for authentic interpretation. Congress, which in the thinking of 1866 was to have 
so central a place, has come to play a minor role. It has seemed far more consistent with our polity 
that for the protection of fundamental rights the citizen look to the courts rather than be dependent 
upon the fluctuating views of the legislature. . . . So when the claim to desegregated treatment was 
presented in orderly litigation, the Court took not only the courageous but the normal course in 
deciding the issue itself. 
Fairman, supra note 120, at 85. 
 122 This Section draws on my lengthier treatments of the constitutional debate over the public 
accommodations provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See generally CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT, THE 
SIT-INS: PROTEST AND LEGAL CHANGE IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 152–79 (2018); Christopher W. 
Schmidt, The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 767, 802–23 (2010). 
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Congress.123 While just a few years earlier the idea that Congress—the same 
institution that was unable to mobilize around even a federal law attacking 
lynching—would act to desegregate privately owned public 
accommodations seemed simply impossible.124 However, by the spring of 
1963, with the Birmingham protests capturing headlines, leading liberals in 
Congress, with the support of the Kennedy Administration, began seriously 
considering public accommodations legislation.125 Once the Administration 
committed itself to what would become Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the debate turned to how to justify congressional power in this area. 
Between the spring and fall of 1963, the constitutional basis for Title II 
was an issue of national debate, a debate that took place in congressional 
hearings, within the Kennedy Justice Department, and in the newspapers.126 
The debate centered on the relative merits of either a Section 5 or a 
Commerce Clause basis for the public accommodations law. While the 
Commerce Clause argument eventually emerged as the primary basis for 
Title II, the Section 5 rationale attracted considerable support, particularly in 
the early stages of the constitutional debate. 
The Fourteenth Amendment approach resonated for several reasons. 
One was the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to deal with 
the legacy of slavery and racial inequality and the Commerce Clause was 
not. Section 5 advocates attacked the Commerce Clause rationale as, in the 
words of Stanford Law School Professor Gerald Gunther, “an inclination 
toward disingenuousness, cynicism and trickery as to constitutional 
principles.”127 As Senator John Sherman Cooper told the Senate Commerce 
Committee: “If there is to be a right to the equal use of accommodations held 
out to the public, it is a right of citizenship and a constitutional right under 
the 14th Amendment. It has nothing to do with whether a business is in 
interstate commerce.”128 
 
 123 See SCHMIDT, supra note 122, at 65–90. 
 124 See, e.g., Earl Lawrence Carl, Reflections on the “Sit-Ins,” 46 CORNELL L.Q. 444, 455 (1961) 
(describing the possibility of a federal public accommodations law as “so remote that a discussion of it is 
largely academic”). 
 125 SCHMIDT, supra note 122, at 154–57. 
 126 See id. at 157–63 (detailing executive branch and congressional debates over the constitutional 
basis for Title II). 
 127 Arthur Krock, When Justices and Law Professors Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1963, at 30 
(quoting a letter from Professor Gunther). 
 128 E.W. Kenworthy, Cooper Questions Rights Bill Basis, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1963, at 1 (quoting 
Senator Cooper). Some in the press agreed. While the Commerce Clause may be acceptable for “a river 
and harbor bill,” the Washington Post lectured, when “logrolling and adjustment” were required, it was 
not appropriate when “basic human rights are at issue.” Editorial, “Practical” Rights Bill, WASH. POST, 
July 10, 1963, at A16. 
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After a brief initial period of political assessment and legal research, 
however, Administration support soon shifted toward the commerce power. 
While the Administration never abandoned Section 5, by the fall of 1963, it 
clearly regarded it as a secondary constitutional basis for congressional 
action. This growing reliance on the Commerce Clause came partly from 
considerations of legislative strategy. The predominantly liberal Senate 
Commerce Committee was a far friendlier place to civil rights legislation 
than the Senate Judiciary Committee—known as the “graveyard of civil 
rights legislation”129—whose chairman was arch-segregationist Senator 
James Eastland of Mississippi.130 So framing the legislation as a regulation 
of interstate commerce justified sending it directly to the Commerce 
Committee, avoiding Eastland’s graveyard.131 
Yet other factors ultimately proved more consequential in shifting the 
Kennedy Administration away from Section 5. The gradual but steady 
undermining of the Kennedy brothers’ initial assumption that Title II would 
derive from the Fourteenth Amendment started with discussions with legal 
experts in the Justice Department and in academia, many of whom believed 
the commerce power to be a safer foundation.132 In particular, Harvard Law 
School Professor Paul A. Freund’s recommendations strongly influenced the 
Administration’s position.133 Professor Freund’s crucial contribution was to 
frame the Commerce Clause approach as more limited than the Fourteenth 
Amendment approach. In a statement submitted to the Senate Commerce 
Committee, Professor Freund warned that “any decision overruling the Civil 
Rights Cases has implications for judicial power and duty that transcend the 
immediate controversy.”134 The Commerce Clause “is primarily a grant of 
 
 129 CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 4 (1985); see also HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960−1972, at 90 (1990). 
 130 In the House there was no such concern: the House Judiciary Committee was chaired by 
Representative Emanuel Celler, a strong civil rights proponent. GRAHAM, supra note 129, at 90. 
 131 See Unsigned Memorandum (June 18, 1963), in 13 CIVIL RIGHTS, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE 
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT—1945–1968: SECURING THE ENACTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 35, 35 (Michal R. Belknap ed., 1991) [hereinafter SECURING THE ENACTMENT] 
(giving a blueprint of the Kennedy Administration’s strategy in proposing the legislation); see also 
GRAHAM, supra note 129, at 90 (detailing the Kennedy Administration’s legislative strategy); E.W. 
Kenworthy, One Rights Plea Expected to Fail, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1963, at 1 (same). 
 132 See, e.g., KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 156–59 (1997); Burke 
Marshall, Legislative Possibilities (May 20, 1963), in SECURING THE ENACTMENT, supra note 131, at 26, 
26–27. 
 133 See GORMLEY, supra note 132, at 140–42; VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 284–85 
(1971). 
 134 See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public 
Accommodations Affecting Interstate Commerce: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on 
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legislative power to Congress, which can be exercised in large or small 
measure, flexibly, pragmatically, tentatively, progressively, while 
guaranteed rights, if they are declared to be conferred by the Constitution, 
are not to be granted or withheld in fragments.”135 Professor Freund’s critical 
assumption was that the coverage of Section 1 and Section 5 was 
coterminous: “[I]t is necessary to arrive at some conception of the range of 
rights which an overruling of the Civil Rights Cases would create for the 
courts and the Congress to enforce.”136 
Yet Professor Freund then suggested a different possibility, referencing 
the idea of decoupling congressional power under Section 5 from the judicial 
definition of the substantive right in Section 1. He suggested that Section 5 
might be treated in a way analogous to the Commerce Clause: as a general 
grant of legislative power, the scope of which would be largely defined by 
the policy evaluation of the Congress, taking heed of both constitutional 
principles and the challenges of implementing federal antidiscrimination 
policy.137 Under this approach, the Court would “draw as wide a gap as 
possible” between congressional Section 5 power and “the self-executing, 
judicially enforced prohibitions of section 1.”138 Yet this approach also posed 
potential risks for the Court, Professor Freund warned. For pursuing this path 
would make “the responsibility on Congress . . . all the greater to think 
through the implications of its action for constitutional claims that are not 
precisely those recognized in the bill but in principle may be comparable.”139 
In highlighting these judicial “implications” of congressional exercise of its 
Section 5 power, Professor Freund seemed to be moving away from his 
earlier suggestion of a gap between judicially enforceable Section 1 rights 
and congressionally enforceable Section 5 rights. Professor Freund’s 
tentative suggestion on the possibility of a Section 1−Section 5 gap was 
never picked up by the bill’s Justice Department advocates. It was his larger 
argument—that the Commerce Clause was not only the stronger foundation 
 
Commerce, 88th Cong. 1187 (1963) (brief of Professor Paul A. Freund) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1732 
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce]. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 1188–89. 
 138 Id. at 1189. 
 139 Id. The comparable constitutional claims that Professor Freund had in mind related to First 
Amendment and due process limitations. Id. at 1188–89. Burke Marshall would echo these concerns in 
his testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee. Id. at 239−40 (statement of Burke Marshall, 
Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
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for Title II, but also the more desirable for its pragmatic and readily 
delineated qualities—that would prove most influential.140 
The theme of detaching Section 1 and Section 5 to which Professor 
Freund alluded also emerged in the congressional testimony of Harvard Law 
School Dean Erwin Griswold. When Dean Griswold claimed that the 
Fourteenth Amendment would be a sufficient constitutional basis for the law, 
he was asked if this meant “that today there is a violation of constitutional 
rights of Negroes when they are rejected in places of public accommodations 
if those places are in any fashion affected by State regulation?”141 “Yes, I 
think this is true,” Dean Griswold responded.142 “It may be an abstract 
violation of constitutional rights for which there is at present no remedy, and 
the question is now whether Congress should not provide a remedy for it.”143 
The influential opinions of Professor Freund and the Justice 
Department officials helped move Attorney General Robert Kennedy to 
become a powerful advocate in the congressional debates for basing Title II 
predominantly on the Commerce Clause. But his acceptance of the 
Commerce Clause rationale stemmed more from pragmatic concerns than 
constitutional analysis. Initially, upon introduction of the bill, the official 
Administration position was that both the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Congress’s commerce power would be relied upon. President Kennedy, in 
his June 19 message to Congress calling for passage of the sweeping civil 
rights bill, highlighted both constitutional bases for Title II.144 The Attorney 
General made the same point in his presentations to congressional 
committees.145 As the Title II debate evolved, however, Robert Kennedy 
would continue to assert his personal opinion that the Section 5 basis was 
sufficient and would be upheld in the Supreme Court,146 yet he would 
increasingly emphasize that the Administration stood squarely behind the 
 
 140 See SCHMIDT, supra note 122, at 162–63 (detailing the triumph of the commerce power rationale 
in congressional debate over Title II). 
 141 Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, supra note 134, at 785 (question by Sen. 
Philip Hart to Erwin Griswold). 
 142 Id. (remarks of Erwin Griswold). 
 143 Id. Dean Griswold’s remarks allude to the concept of “underenforced” constitutional rights, which 
has been subsequently developed most prominently in the work of Professor Lawrence Sager. See 
generally LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE (2004); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
 144 John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, THE 
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 19, 1963), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9283 
[https://perma.cc/QC3Q-XYB9]. 
 145 Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, supra note 134, at 23 (statement of 
Robert Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 146 See id. at 26, 28, 74, 78. 
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Commerce Clause and that Section 5 was best treated as a secondary 
justification. He repeatedly asserted that the Supreme Court would have little 
trouble approving of the constitutionality of Title II under the Commerce 
Clause.147 Furthermore, picking up Professor Freund’s critical contribution 
to the discussion, Attorney General Kennedy argued that the Commerce 
Clause framework added a valuable limiting factor to the scope of the law.148 
In his appeal to moderates in Congress, Robert Kennedy emphasized this 
limiting argument as the critical advantage for the Commerce Clause 
approach.149 
The Attorney General also picked up a point from Professor Freund’s 
brief that the Fourteenth Amendment rationale opened a Pandora’s box of 
other constitutional claims.150 The assumption here, as in the Freund brief, 
was that for the Court to uphold congressional policy passed under Section 
5, it would necessarily need to bring its Section 1 jurisprudence into 
alignment. 
The Administration was successful in its campaign to fight the 
expanded version of Title II by highlighting the limiting role of the 
Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause rationale for Title II, framed by 
the Administration as the less far-reaching approach, became a central tool 
for attracting congressional moderates.151 The alternative Section 5-based 
rationale was soon abandoned, and by the end of 1963, supporters of the bill 
were relying predominantly on the Commerce Clause rationale, with Section 
5 remaining to cover any facilities affected by official state segregation 
policy and as a secondary rationale for covering other public 
accommodations.152 By the opening of 1964, with the constitutional basis of 
Title II largely settled, the debate turned toward getting the bill through 
Congress. The House passed the omnibus civil rights bill, including Title II, 
on February 10, 1964, on a vote of 290–130. After a lengthy filibuster, the 
 
 147 See id. at 23, 73. 
 148 See, e.g., id. at 57–60, 74. 
 149 See, e.g., id. 
 150 Press Conference of Attorney Gen. Robert F. Kennedy (Oct. 15, 1963), in SECURING THE 
ENACTMENT, supra note 131, at 67, 88 (asking whether a Section 5 rationale for Title II would mean that 
private employers would have to grant due process rights to employees before firing them or that religious 
schools could be sued for violating the First Amendment). 
 151 E.W. Kenworthy, Capital Girds for Battle over Civil Rights Program, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1963, 
at 147. 
 152 In its final form, Title II applied to a public accommodation “if its operations affect commerce, 
or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012). 
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Senate did the same on June 19, by a vote of 73–27. With President 
Johnson’s signature, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became law on July 2.153 
2. The Debate in the Supreme Court 
The constitutionality of Title II was challenged immediately after it was 
passed, and before the year ended, the Supreme Court upheld it as a 
legitimate exercise of the commerce power,154 while reserving the question 
of Section 5 as a basis for the law.155 
In the years preceding passage of the Civil Rights Act, the Justices 
struggled with a series of cases involving appeals of criminal convictions of 
young African-American men and women who had taken part in lunch 
counter sit-in protests.156 Throughout their deliberations in the sit-in cases, 
the Justices remained sharply divided on the basic state action question: 
whether, as a self-enforcing right to be recognized in the courts, the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected against discrimination in privately owned 
public accommodations.157 Yet a majority—perhaps even all—of the Justices 
expressed a willingness to recognize congressional power to regulate public 
accommodations through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.158 Thus, 
by the time members of Congress seriously started to consider the 
constitutional basis for a federal public accommodations law, a Court sharply 
divided on the question of state action under Section 1 appeared to be in 
agreement on recognizing some level of congressional latitude in defining 
state action under Section 5. 
For those Justices who concluded that proprietors of public 
accommodations were state actors for purposes of the Equal Protection 
Clause,159 congressional enforcement in this area was straightforward: there 
was no question that Congress, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, had the power to enforce a judicially recognized equal 
protection right. But for those Justices who refused to extend Section 1 to 
cover public accommodations discrimination, the Section 5 question posed 
some difficulty. This group of Justices, led by Justice Black, began to make 
the case for the Court extending to Congress some measure of interpretive 
 
 153 The Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Long Struggle for Freedom, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/civil-rights-act/civil-rights-act-of-1964.html [https://perma.cc/D65W-
APX5]. 
 154 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253–58 (1964); Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299–300, 304–05 (1964). 
 155 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 249–50. 
 156 See generally SCHMIDT, supra note 122, ch. 5. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 170. 
 159 For most of October Term 1963, this included Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan, 
Douglas, and Goldberg. SCHMIDT, supra note 122, at 134–47, 169–71. 
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latitude in defining state action under its Section 5 enforcement powers. 
Among themselves at least—for only hints of this would reach published 
Court opinions—they recognized that a congressional definition of state 
action (under Section 5) might go beyond a judicial definition (under Section 
1). 
In the Court’s confrontation with public accommodations 
discrimination, Justice Black emerged as not only the staunchest defender of 
the state action doctrine (when considered as a Section 1-only question) but 
also the most outspoken proponent of the constitutional validity of federal 
public accommodations legislation under Section 5. During deliberations in 
the sit-in cases, he said he would be willing to abandon the Civil Rights 
Cases—referring to its Section 5 holding, not its definition of the state action 
doctrine as applied to judicially enforceable (i.e., Section 1) rights.160 In his 
dissent in Bell v. Maryland, where he denounced the tactics of the sit-in 
protesters and rejected their Fourteenth Amendment claim, he repeatedly 
referenced congressional Section 5 power to prohibit discrimination in 
public accommodations.161 And after the Court heard the challenge to Title 
II, he told his colleagues: “I would prefer to go on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but I think that Congress limited the act to the commerce 
clause. Otherwise, I would be for overruling the Civil Rights Cases.”162 In 
his concurrence in one of the Title II cases, Justice Black emphasized that 
his Bell dissent did not pass judgment on the scope of Section 5 power and 
that he agreed with the opinion of the Court that this question should not be 
faced in these cases.163 
Justice Brennan struggled to reconcile the Court’s handling of the sit-in 
cases with the constitutional basis for the public accommodations legislation 
that Congress was considering. In a handwritten note to Justice Douglas, 
presumably written from the bench during oral arguments in the October 
Term 1963 sit-in cases,164 Justice Brennan sought to make sense of the novel 
situation in which the Court found itself, with a Congress that appeared 
poised to press ahead of the Court on a major civil rights issue. His words 
captured the Supreme Court’s emerging Section 5 doctrine: 
 
 160 See IN CONFERENCE, supra note 92, at 712; Earl Warren, Conference Notes, n.d. (Warren Papers, 
Box 510, “Sit-In cases, O.T. 1963: Combined Cases”). 
 161 See 378 U.S. 226, 326, 331, 343, 345 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 162 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 92, at 727. 
 163 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 278–79 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). 
 164 The note is on generic Supreme Court stationary (not the personalized stationary typically used 
when Justices communicate with one another from their chambers) and is found in Justice Douglas’s Bell 
file. Memorandum from William J. Brennan to William O. Douglas, n.d. (Douglas Papers, Box 1315, 
“No. 12 – Bell v. Maryland: Misc. Memos, Cert Memo”). 
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[I]s it “enforcing” legislation if the Court holds that section 1 does not protect 
the Negroes’ right to service but rather the owner’s right to exclude them? What 
then does Congress “enforce”? . . . [M]ay [Congress] under section 5 erase a 
right this Court holds is protected by section 1? I ask, not because I’m opposed 
to the result, but because I don’t know.165 
When the Justices discussed the sit-in cases in conference, Justice Brennan 
again raised this concern.166 Ultimately, however, he would conclude that 
Congress had not expressed any intent in Title II to press beyond existing 
judicial interpretation of the state action doctrine.167 
Justice Douglas’s approach to Section 5 was more the product of 
strategy than constitutional principle. He adjusted his views of Section 5 
according to the leverage it could bring for his preferred interpretation of 
Section 1. When he sought to sway his brethren to his position on the 
constitutional claim of the sit-in protesters, he emphasized the need to have 
a tight linkage between Section 1 and Section 5. “Apart from the Commerce 
Clause, Congress has no power to legislate in this field if there is no state 
action in the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,” he wrote in an October 
21, 1963 memorandum.168  
[I]f we hold that restaurants and other businesses serving the public cannot 
discriminate against people on account of race, Congress can “enforce” that 
construction of the Fourteenth Amendment. But if we hold that this kind of 
discrimination is beyond the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment there is 
nothing for Congress to “enforce” and the Civil Rights Cases are vindicated.169  
Later that term, however, when he recognized that he lacked the votes 
for this Section 1 position, Justice Douglas took quite a different line, 
accepting the Section 1−Section 5 decoupling he had recently rejected. He 
wrote: “Congress by reason of § 5 has some leeway to define what due 
process requires in protection of federally protected rights. Moreover, 
 
 165 Id. 
 166 Hugo Black, Conference Notes, Oct. 23, 1963, in The Deliberations of the Justices in Deciding 
the Sit-In Cases of June 22, 1964, at 4 (A.E. Dick Howard & John G. Kester eds.) (Hugo L. Black Papers, 
Box 376, “Oct. Term 1963: Sit-In Cases,” Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.) 
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the Civil Rights Cases, and that these cases must go on the commerce clause”). 
 168 William O. Douglas, Memorandum to the Conference (Oct. 21, 1963) (William O. Douglas 
Papers, Box 1315, “No. 12: Bell v. Maryland: Law Clerks-3,” Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
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dissent in Robinson v. Florida 7–9 (Mar. 11, 1964) (Douglas Papers, Box 1314, “No 12: Bell v. Maryland: 
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Congress has authority to define what is ‘state’ action within the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in order to protect federal rights against 
dilution.”170 
In the end, only Justices Douglas and Goldberg insisted that the Section 
5 issue needed to be faced.171 Justice Goldberg noted in the Justices’ private 
conference that “[t]he legislative history shows confusion on the Fourteenth 
Amendment issue.”172 Justice Goldberg seemed to understand Congress as 
having relied on the Court’s definition of state action, rather than having 
fashioned its own definition. Justices Douglas and Goldberg found authority 
for Title II in both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.173 
 
*          *          * 
 
These debates among judges, lawyers, lawmakers, and academics over 
the scope of congressional authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
reveal the articulation and widespread acceptance of what might appear a 
striking premise: that Congress may define for itself what the provisions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment mean, even if such definitions do not align with 
the way the courts have defined its provisions. Those involved in these 
debates generally did not see this premise as some kind of bold or radical 
innovation. To the contrary, it was often advanced as a more cautious route 
to constitutional change, one that allowed Congress, rather than the courts, 
to take a leading role in confronting the challenges of breaking down the 
structures of white supremacy in American law and society. 
III. MORGAN AND THE OCTOBER TERM 1965 
In the spring of 1966, the Supreme Court issued a series of landmark 
decisions involving congressional enforcement power under the 
Reconstruction Amendments, culminating in Katzenbach v. Morgan. The 
Justices’ treatment of these cases built upon the Section 5 discussions of the 
previous decades. While the specific questions considered in the 1965 Term 
cases were novel—mostly involving Congress’s use of its enforcement 
power in passing various provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965—the 
 
 170 William O. Douglas, draft dissent, Bell v. Maryland 27 (Mar. 24, 1964) (Douglas Papers, Box 
1314, “No. 12: Bell v. Maryland: Galley Proofs”). Douglas also found congressional authority to enact a 
public accommodations law under the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. 
 171 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 92, at 727–28. 
 172 Id. at 728 (“It utilized § 5 as they thought § 5 might be read, no matter how broadly.”). 
 173 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 286–91 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. 
at 291–93 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
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assumptions behind the Court’s emerging Section 5 jurisprudence were 
already largely established, the result of the previous decades of debates, 
inside and outside the courts, over the scope of the congressional 
enforcement power. 
A. South Carolina v. Katzenbach 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965174 included broad protections of the 
franchise, justified under the enforcement provision of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.175 The law authorized the Justice Department to suspend 
literacy tests in any county in which fewer than half the eligible voters were 
registered.176 It also authorized the Justice Department to have federal 
officials assume control over the voter registration process in certain states, 
and affected states had to preclear any changes in voting practices.177 
President Johnson signed the bill on August 6, 1965, and South Carolina 
immediately challenged the law as outside the scope of congressional 
enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment.178 The Court moved 
quickly, and on March 7, 1966, it issued a resounding stamp of constitutional 
approval.179 
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach left no doubt that Congress had broad authority to protect the 
right to vote.180 In response to South Carolina’s contention that the sweeping 
remedial scheme of the law threatened the prerogatives of the courts in 
defining the scope of constitutional protections,181 Chief Justice Warren 
broadly interpreted Congress’s power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment: “By adding this authorization, the Framers indicated that 
Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created 
in § 1.”182 He cited language from Ex parte Virginia that indicated that 
“Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional 
prohibition against racial discrimination in voting.”183 Chief Justice Warren 
 
 174 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)). 
 175 The law was titled: “An Act to enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, and for other purposes.” Id. 
 176 Id. at § 4(a)–(b). 
 177 See id. at § 5. 
 178 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966). 
 179 See id. at 301, 337. 
 180 Id. at 308 (“The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial 
discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a 
century.”). 
 181 Id. at 325. 
 182 Id. at 325–26. 
 183 Id. at 326 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879)). 
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then brought the role of the Court in reviewing congressional enforcement 
power into alignment with the deferential posture it embraced under 
Congress’s other enumerated powers. Chief Justice Warren explained that in 
reviewing any exercise of congressional lawmaking authority, the “basic 
test” for the courts should be the one Chief Justice John Marshall famously 
laid down in McCulloch: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope 
of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”184 The rest of the Court accepted 
the standard Chief Justice Warren offered.185 
B. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections 
On its face, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections186 seems to have 
nothing to do with Section 5. The central question the Court confronted was 
a Section 1 issue: Does the poll tax violate the Equal Protection Clause? To 
this, the Court answered with a resounding and sweeping yes.187 Justice 
Douglas’s opinion for the majority defended the idea of a living 
Constitution—probably the most extreme articulation of this principle ever 
to emerge from the Court. “[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to 
the political theory of a particular era,” Justice Douglas wrote.188 “In 
determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never 
been confined to historic notions of equality . . . .”189 Rather, Justice Douglas 
assumed the Justices of the Court would determine when “historic notions of 
equality” were no longer sufficient.190 Harper has generally been 
remembered for this commitment to an evolving Constitution with the Court 
as the arbiters of its evolving meaning.191 
 
 184 Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)). 
 185 Justice Black dissented with regard to the preclearance requirement contained in Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act (based on his belief that it unconstitutionally interfered with state sovereignty), id. at 
358 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but he accepted the Court’s deferential approach 
to review of Congress’s powers under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, id. at 355 (“[Section] 2 of 
the Amendment unmistakably gives Congress specific power to go further [than the prohibitions of § 1] 
and pass appropriate legislation to protect this right to vote against any method of abridgment no matter 
how subtle.”). 
 186 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 187 The poll tax, wrote Justice Douglas for the Court, constituted an “invidious” form of wealth 
discrimination, id. at 668 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)), 
and “wealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications,” id. at 670. 
 188 Id. at 669. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 See Ackerman & Nou, supra note 54, at 111–13. 
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But Harper is also significant for what the Court did not discuss, for a 
major Section 5 debate lurked in the background. In the debates that led to 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Congress had considered abolishing the poll tax 
in all state elections.192 While a straight prohibition did not make it into the 
final draft, the final bill did include a provision in which Congress expressed 
its opinion that the poll tax violated the Fourteenth Amendment and ordered 
the Attorney General to press this position in federal court. The Court was 
thus able to avoid squarely facing the Section 5 issue. Rather than 
considering whether Congress had the power under Section 5 to strike down 
the poll tax—despite the fact that Breedlove v. Suttles held that the poll tax 
was constitutional193—the Court considered Harper solely as a Section 1 
challenge without mentioning that Congress had already weighed in on this 
issue. 
When the Justices first considered Harper in early 1965, a six-Justice 
majority was ready to summarily reject the challenge and reassert the validity 
of Breedlove in a single-sentence per curiam decision.194 But Justice 
Goldberg planned to dissent, and his draft opinion, which drew on the 
ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment as a basis for undermining 
Breedlove (the Voting Rights Act had yet to be passed), convinced some of 
his colleagues to reconsider.195 By the time the Court heard full arguments in 
the case, the Voting Rights Act had passed, and its poll tax provision featured 
prominently in the Justice Department’s argument before the Court.196 
The dissenters in Harper were left to raise the question of Section 5. At 
oral argument, Justice Black lashed out at the Justice Department for 
counseling Congress not to strike down the poll tax under its enforcement 
powers—either Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the analogous 
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment—on the expectation that the Court 
would deal with the issue.197 Although Justice Black would write a scathing 
 
 192 The poll tax had been abolished in federal elections the previous year by the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
 193 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937). 
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N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
86 
dissent in Harper, he went out of his way to recognize the power of Congress 
to strike down the poll tax.198 His decision contains two points. The first is 
that the Court was making policy, reminiscent of the discredited Lochner199 
Court, when it reinterpreted the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit the poll 
tax.200 This attack on the “old ‘natural law due process formula’” approach 
to constitutional interpretation is well-known. His second major point—the 
one that often gets lost beneath the Douglas−Black confrontation over 
interpreting Section 1—was that Congress, in Justice Black’s view, 
unquestionably has power to reinterpret the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.201 What Justice Black denounced Justice Douglas for doing, he 
believed Congress was fully empowered to do. 
[T]he people, in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, designated the 
governmental tribunal they wanted to provide additional rules to enforce the 
guarantees of that Amendment. The branch of Government they chose was not 
the Judicial Branch but the Legislative. I have no doubt at all that Congress has 
the power under § 5 to pass legislation to abolish the poll tax in order to protect 
the citizens of this country if it believes that the poll tax is being used as a device 
to deny voters equal protection of the laws. But this legislative power which 
was granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to 
Congress. . . . [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in accordance with our 
constitutional structure of government authorizes the Congress to pass 
definitive legislation to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights which it has done 
many times. For Congress to do this fits in precisely with the division of powers 
originally entrusted to the three branches of government—Executive, 
Legislative, and Judicial. But for us to undertake in the guise of constitutional 
interpretation to decide the constitutional policy question of this case amounts, 
in my judgment, to a plain exercise of power which the Constitution has denied 
us but has specifically granted to Congress.202 
It was on this broad power of Congress under Section 5 and the way it 
allows both the Court and Congress to better fulfill their constitutional duties 
that Justice Black concluded his Harper dissent. The failure of Congress to 
exercise its authority—and the role of the Johnson Administration in 
convincing Congress not to act—was clearly still on Justice Black’s mind 
 
 198 Harper, 383 U.S. at 678–80 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 199 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 200 Harper, 383 U.S. at 670–78 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 201 The edited version of Harper contained in most constitutional law casebooks does not include 
Justice Black’s Section 5 discussion. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
CASESCOMMENTSQUESTIONS 1365 (10th ed. 2006); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD 
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 202 Harper, 383 U.S. at 678–80 (citations omitted). 
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when the Court delivered its decision on March 24, 1966. In announcing his 
dissent, Justice Black again attacked Attorney General Katzenbach for 
advising Congress that it lacked such power under Section 5.203 
C. United States v. Guest 
United States v. Guest204 involved a challenge to an indictment of six 
private individuals under the civil rights conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241 
(1964), a law derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and based on 
Congress’s Section 5 power. The six men were accused of conspiring to 
deprive African Americans of certain rights protected under the Constitution 
and federal civil rights law, including their right to travel freely across state 
borders and their right of access to public accommodations.205 The crux of 
the case was whether § 241 applied to purely private action and, if so, 
whether Congress had the authority under Section 5 to prohibit such private 
activity when it would not necessarily violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it lacked the requisite state action.206 Writing for a divided Court, 
Justice Stewart found a means to avoid this difficult issue. He located a state 
action basis for the indictment by noting that the indictment alleged that the 
private conspirators “caus[ed] the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports 
that such Negroes had committed criminal acts”207—thereby creating a direct 
linkage between the private actors and the state.208 
Nonetheless, Justice Stewart’s opinion explicitly reserved the question 
of the extent to which Congress might prohibit behavior under Section 5 that 
would not be unconstitutional itself. When aimed at prohibiting conspiracies 
to infringe upon equal protection rights, the coverage of § 241, Stewart 
noted, was directly coterminous with the coverage of the Equal Protection 
Clause: “[W]e emphasize that § 241 by its clear language incorporates no 
more than the Equal Protection Clause itself; the statute does not purport to 
give substantive, as opposed to remedial, implementation to any rights 
 
 203 See John P. MacKenzie, Supreme Court Outlaws All Poll Taxes, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1966, at 
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secured by that Clause.”209 Yet Justice Stewart went on to suggest that 
Congress’s Section 5 power extends further:  
Since we therefore deal here only with the bare terms of the Equal Protection 
Clause itself, nothing said in this opinion goes to the question of what kinds of 
other and broader legislation Congress might constitutionally enact under § 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to implement that Clause or any other provision 
of the Amendment.210 
Justice Clark wrote a short concurrence, joined by Justices Black and 
Fortas, in which he sought to clarify his view on the Section 5 issue that 
Justice Stewart refused to confront. Justice Clark concluded: “[I]t is, I 
believe, both appropriate and necessary under the circumstances here to say 
that there now can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers 
the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies—with or without state 
action—that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.”211 
Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, 
wrote a sweeping opinion that foreshadowed the broad reading of Section 5 
that he would rely upon several months later in his Morgan opinion. This 
broad reading included the recognition of a gap between the reach of possible 
congressional regulation when acting under its Section 5 power and the reach 
of the Fourteenth Amendment absent congressional action. Like Justice 
Clark, Justice Brennan construed § 241 to apply to private conspiracies to 
interfere with constitutionally protected rights.212 Even if the Constitution 
itself did not prohibit private interference with a particular constitutional 
right, Justice Brennan wrote, Section 5 legislation designed to “secure” that 
constitutional right could do so: 
A right is “secured . . . by the Constitution” within the meaning of § 241 if it 
emanates from the Constitution, if it finds its source in the Constitution. Section 
241 must thus be viewed, in this context, as an exercise of congressional power 
to amplify prohibitions of the Constitution addressed, as is invariably the case, 
to government officers; contrary to the view of the Court, I think we are dealing 
 
 209 Id. at 754–55. Justice Stewart’s distinction between “substantive” and “remedial” enforcement of 
the Fourteenth Amendment under Section 5 would be further developed in Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 666–68 (1966), an opinion Justice Stewart joined. 
 210 Guest, 383 U.S. at 755. 
 211 Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring). 
 212 Id. at 775–81 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He noted,  
I believe that § 241 reaches such a private conspiracy, not because the Fourteenth Amendment of 
its own force prohibits such a conspiracy, but because § 241, as an exercise of congressional 
power under § 5 of that Amendment, prohibits all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of a 
“right . . . secured . . . by the Constitution.” 
Id. at 777 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964)). 
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here with a statute that seeks to implement the Constitution, not with the “bare 
terms” of the Constitution. Section 241 is not confined to protecting rights 
against private conspiracies that the Constitution or another federal law also 
protects against private interferences. No such duplicative function was 
envisioned in its enactment.213 
Rather than the strict remedial–substantive distinction favored by Justice 
Stewart (and embraced by Justice Harlan in Morgan214), Justice Brennan here 
argued that Congress has power under Section 5 to “amplify” and 
“implement” an established Fourteenth Amendment right. 
Justice Brennan noted:  
A majority of the members of the Court expresses the view today that § 5 
empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with 
the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not state officers or 
others acting under the color of state law are implicated in the conspiracy.215  
He then explained that:  
[Section] 5 authorizes Congress to make laws that it concludes are reasonably 
necessary to protect a right created by and arising under that Amendment; and 
Congress is thus fully empowered to determine that punishment of private 
conspiracies interfering with the exercise of such a right is necessary to its full 
protection. It made that determination in enacting § 241 and, therefore § 241 is 
constitutional legislation as applied to reach the private conspiracy alleged in 
the . . . indictment.216  
In addressing the narrow reading of Section 5 in the Civil Rights Cases, 
Justice Brennan wrote: “I do not accept—and a majority of the Court today 
rejects—this interpretation of § 5. It reduces the legislative power to enforce 
the provisions of the Amendment to that of the judiciary; and it attributes a 
far too limited objective to the Amendment’s sponsors.”217 
Justice Brennan’s opinion put forward the idea that the proper 
framework for analyzing the scope of congressional power under Section 5 
was the one outlined in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (soon reiterated and 
 
 213 Id. at 779. 
 214 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 666–68 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 215 Guest, 383 U.S. at 782 (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan included in this count the Justices who 
joined the Clark concurrence (Justices Black and Fortas) and the Justices who joined his opinion (Chief 
Justice Warren and Justice Douglas). Id. at 782 n.6. He noted that Justice Stewart’s “opinion d[id] not 
purport to deal with this question.” Id. 
 216 Id. at 782. 
 217 Id. at 783 (footnote omitted). 
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extended in Morgan),218 which drew on Chief Justice Marshall’s famous 
language from McCulloch.219 He explained: 
Viewed in its proper perspective, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears as 
a positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exercise its 
discretion in fashioning remedies to achieve civil and political equality for all 
citizens. . . . And I can find no principle of federalism nor word of the 
Constitution that denies Congress power to determine that in order adequately 
to protect the right to equal utilization of state facilities, it is also appropriate to 
punish other individuals—not state officers themselves and not acting in concert 
with state officers—who engage in the same brutal conduct for the same 
misguided purpose.220 
Justice Brennan concluded his opinion by admitting that the vagueness of 
§ 241 makes it “certainly not model legislation for punishing private 
conspiracies.”221 Yet the appropriate “remedy [wa]s for Congress to write a 
law without this defect. . . . [I]f Congress desires to give the statute more 
definite scope, it may find ways of doing so.”222 
Justice Harlan was the only member of the Guest Court to explicitly 
reject the possibility that § 241 could prohibit purely private conspiracies.223 
He rested his decision completely on statutory grounds, refusing to address 
the underlying constitutional question of whether Congress could have 
prohibited private conspiracies under Section 5 if it chose to do so. And he 
lashed out at Justices Clark, Black, and Fortas for “cursorily pronouncing 
themselves on the far-reaching constitutional questions deliberately not 
reached” by the Stewart opinion, an action that seemed to Justice Harlan, “to 
say the very least, extraordinary.”224 Although he steered away from 
discussing Section 5 power in a general way, he spent several pages 
explaining his belief in the importance of rigorous judicial oversight of the 
state action requirement—a discussion that begins in the context of the 
“nebulous” right to travel, but that blends into a general defense of the state 
action doctrine.225 Ultimately, Justice Harlan simply did not see the need for 
federal power to protect against private interference with interstate travel, a 
position he described as justified based on “policy as well as precedent.”226 
 
 218 “It seems to me,” Justice Brennan noted, “that this is also the standard that defines the scope of 
congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 784. 
 219 Id. at 783–84 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)). 
 220 Id. at 784. 
 221 Id. at 785. 
 222 Id. at 786. 
 223 Id. at 762–73 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 224 Id. at 762 n.1. 
 225 See id. at 771–73. 
 226 Id. 
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D. Katzenbach v. Morgan 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, like South Carolina v. Katzenbach, involved a 
challenge to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.227 At issue in Morgan was § 4(e) 
of the Voting Rights Act, a provision that prohibited the denial of the vote to 
non-English-language speakers who had completed the sixth grade in a 
Puerto Rican school.228 The drafters of § 4(e) explicitly relied upon 
Congress’s Section 5 powers.229 
Section 4(e) appeared to be in conflict with Lassiter v. Northampton 
County Board of Elections,230 a 1959 decision in which the Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld a literacy requirement for voting. The critical issue in 
Morgan was whether Congress, using its authority under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, could prohibit a literacy test that was, under existing 
case law, not itself a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In short, Could 
the Court uphold § 4(e) without overruling Lassiter? 
Two separate three-judge district court panels heard challenges to § 4(e) 
before Morgan made its way to the Supreme Court. Morgan was first heard 
in a Washington, D.C. district court, which struck down the provision as 
beyond congressional power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights.231 In 
striking down the provision, the D.C. district court’s opinion was dismissive 
of the way in which § 4(e) was passed, characterizing the provision as 
essentially snuck into the larger bill with minimal consideration.232 The 
decision also questioned the entire project of federal oversight of state 
elections.233 Moreover, the D.C. district court gave practically no attention to 
the fact that it was an act of Congress that was at issue. The entire reasoning 
of the decision treated the issue as basically a Fourteenth Amendment 
challenge to New York’s literacy test. 
A New York district court panel heard another challenge to § 4(e) and 
upheld the provision.234 In contrast to the D.C. panel’s holding, the New York 
district court expressed its approval for the general goals of the Voting Rights 
Act and offered a sweeping interpretation of Section 5 that foreshadowed 
 
 227 384 U.S. 641 (1965). 
 228 Id. at 643–45. 
 229 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (2012) (“Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under the 
fourteenth amendment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom 
language was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the States from conditioning the right to vote 
of such persons on ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language.”). 
 230 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 231 Morgan v. Katzenbach, 247 F. Supp. 196, 204 (D.D.C. 1965) (ruling on a challenge to the New 
York literacy test). 
 232 Id. at 200. 
 233 Id. at 202–03. 
 234 United States v. Cty. Bd. of Elections, 248 F. Supp. 316, 323 (W.D.N.Y. 1965). 
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Justice Brennan’s Morgan decision.235 Although the Voting Rights Act was 
aimed primarily at disfranchisement of African Americans in the South, the 
larger goal was “to eliminate second-class citizenship wherever present”236—
hence, § 4(e) was in line with the central thrust of the legislation. More 
significant was the court’s description of the Section 5 power:  
Section 5 . . . would be superfluous if Congress’ role was merely to passively 
await the determination by a court that there is a need for legislation to protect 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
Inherent in its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress 
must be considered as having some latitude to determine for itself what patterns 
of activity contravene Fourteenth Amendment rights.237 
The opinion also referenced the institutional competence of Congress in 
evaluating certain issues: “We cannot say, therefore, that in view of the 
extensive backdrop to this legislation, Congress made a determination on a 
matter in which it lacked special competence and experience when it enacted 
Section 4(e). The judgment of Congress here, was one which it was superbly 
suited to make.”238 
On April 18, 1966, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan.239 To uphold § 4(e), the Court had four options: it 
could (1) use the case as an opportunity to overturn Lassiter; (2) uphold 
§ 4(e) as an appropriate remedial scheme for protecting judicially established 
constitutional rights (even if the remedies prohibited activity that did not 
itself violate judicially recognized constitutional rights); (3) recognize that 
Congress might understand the precise coverage of Fourteenth Amendment 
rights in ways that differed from the Court’s own jurisprudence, and act to 
enforce this congressional understanding; or (4) use some combination of 
these options. Justices Douglas and Fortas embraced the first option in a 
companion case to Morgan, Cardona v. Power.240 Justice Brennan’s majority 
opinion in Morgan contained both the second and third options. 
 
 235 Id. at 322. 
 236 Id. at 317. 
 237 Id. at 322. 
 238 Id. at 322–23. 
 239 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 240 384 U.S. 672 (1966). Initiated prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Cardona 
presented a direct Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the New York literacy test as applied to a New 
York citizen who was born and educated in Puerto Rico. Id. at 673. The Court remanded the case to see 
if the appellant was covered by Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 674. But Justice Douglas, 
joined by Justice Fortas, dissented on this point, calling for Lassiter to be narrowly construed. Id. at 675 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan included a discussion of the Cardona case in his Morgan dissent, 
rejecting the challenge based on Lassiter. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 659–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In his 
rather cursory dissent in Cardona, Justice Douglas largely ignored Congress, much as he did in his Harper 
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Morgan did not appear to be a particularly difficult decision for the 
Court. At their initial conference following oral arguments, only Justice 
Harlan was ready to strike down § 4(e) as outside Congress’s Section 5 
power.241 Justice Stewart, who would join Justice Harlan’s dissent late in the 
drafting process,242 admitted to having “trouble with this case,” but initially 
agreed with the majority.243 The rest of the Court simply appeared to have 
little doubt about the validity of § 4(e) as an exercise of Congress’s Section 
5 power.244 Chief Justice Warren set the tone for the discussion when he 
opened the conference by framing Morgan as a straightforward extension of 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach: “Congress may legislate against 
discrimination against voting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Congress need not make findings or justify its actions if we can justify its 
conduct on any rational basis. Section 4(e) is constitutional.”245 Chief Justice 
Warren was simply summarizing what had become the generally accepted 
position within the Court: that the exercise of the Section 5 power, like the 
exercise of the commerce power, deserved the highest level of judicial 
deference. 
Justice Brennan almost did not get the opportunity to write the majority 
opinion in Morgan. The Chief Justice initially offered it to Justice Black. 
Justice Black had been proclaiming his belief in a broad Section 5 power in 
his dissents in Bell v. Maryland and the recently announced Harper decision. 
But Justice Black refused the offer, explaining, according to Justice 
Brennan’s account, “that his views as to the far-reaching scope of § 5 power 
would not obtain the support of a majority.”246 Chief Justice Warren then 
turned to Justice Brennan, a decision Justice Brennan assumed was based on 
his analysis of Section 5 in his Guest opinion.247 
 
opinion. See Cardona, 384 U.S. at 675–77 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He barely mentioned the existence 
of Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, and he made no reference to the congressional interpretation of 
the Equal Protection Clause expressed in Section 4(e) as a factor in his decision. Id. 
 241 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 92, at 828. 
 242 Brennan Memo, supra note 203, at xxxvii. 
 243 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 92, at 828. 
 244 See id. at 827–28 (discussing the Justices’ views at conference). According to Justice Brennan, 
Justice White felt some uncertainty with the Section 1–Section 5 disconnect on which Justice Brennan’s 
opinion was premised, but after reading Justice Harlan’s dissent, he decided to join the majority. Brennan 
Memo, supra note 203, at xxxvi–xxxvii. Justice White’s comments at the Justices’ conference, however, 
explicitly accepted a distinction between congressional and judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. IN CONFERENCE, supra note 92, at 828 (“This is Congress’s definition of ‘equal protection,’ 
and it is valid. . . . That means that we would allow Congress to declare what is a denial of equal 
protection. Without the statute, I would have trouble. But if it is not too far out of line i[t] is okay.”). 
 245 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 92, at 827. 
 246 Brennan Memo, supra note 203, at xxxiv. 
 247 Id. In oral arguments in Morgan, Justice Brennan urged counsel to consider the connection 
between that case and Guest, which the Court decided a few weeks earlier. Transcript of Oral Arguments 
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Justice Black did, however, play an important advisory role in the 
drafting of Justice Brennan’s Morgan opinion. Justice Brennan showed a 
draft to Justice Black before he distributed it to the other Justices.248 Justice 
Black expressed enthusiasm for Justice Brennan’s approach and urged him 
to make his Section 5 analysis even bolder.249 He had Justice Brennan remove 
a footnote that suggested grounds on which Lassiter could be 
distinguished,250 and in a subsequent draft, Justice Black made further 
suggestions designed “to emphasize the distinction between the legislative 
and judicial functions.”251 When Justice Black formally joined Justice 
Brennan’s opinion in Morgan, he wrote: “I am happy to agree to this historic 
opinion, which for the first time gives § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment the 
full scope I think it was intended to have.”252 
A central theme of Justice Brennan’s opinion was the need for the Court 
to respect Congress’s responsibility under Section 5: 
A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that the 
enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, 
as a condition of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both 
congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for 
implementing the Amendment. It would confine the legislative power in this 
context to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the 
judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely 
informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the “majestic 
generalities” of § 1 of the Amendment.253 
The relevant question before the Court, Justice Brennan emphasized, was not 
whether New York’s literacy test violated the Equal Protection Clause but 
rather the constitutionality of congressional regulation of that test when 
exercising its Section 5 power.254 
Before evaluating this question, Justice Brennan briefly turned to the 
history of Section 5: “By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to 
Congress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
 
in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (No. 847), in 63 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1165 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Gerhard Casper eds. 1975). The counsel, J. Lee Rankin, who was representing the New York City Board 
of Elections in support of § 4(e), responded to Justice Brennan’s prompt by characterizing Guest as “a 
recognition that there is more to Section 5 than is found in Section 1.” Id. 
 248 Brennan Memo, supra note 203, at xxxiv–xxxv. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. at xxxv. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1966) (footnote omitted). 
 254 Id. at 649. 
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the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”255 
Justice Brennan supported this point with a footnote explaining that the 
earliest versions of the Fourteenth Amendment actually employed this 
“necessary and proper” phrasing.256 “The substitution of the ‘appropriate 
legislation’ formula,” Justice Brennan noted, “was never thought to have the 
effect of diminishing the scope of this congressional power.”257 He followed 
with a quotation from Ex parte Virginia,258 an obligatory citation for any 
broad reading of Section 5.259 Then he noted that a deferential rational basis 
test was the standard to apply in reviewing congressional regulation under 
Section 5.260 “Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power 
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and 
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”261 
After considering the history of Section 5, Justice Brennan identified 
two rationales for upholding § 4(e). First, he treated the barring of the 
literacy test as remedial legislation designed to protect judicially recognized 
Fourteenth Amendment rights: “§ 4(e) may be viewed as a measure to secure 
for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory 
treatment by government—both in the imposition of voting qualifications 
and the provision or administration of governmental services, such as public 
schools, public housing and law enforcement.”262 With their right to vote 
protected, Puerto Ricans could secure “enhanced political power [that] will 
be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the 
entire Puerto Rican community. Section 4(e) thereby enables the Puerto 
Rican minority better to obtain ‘perfect equality of civil rights and the equal 
protection of the laws.’”263 The Court’s standard for evaluating this 
legislative judgment was extremely deferential: 
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh 
the various conflicting considerations—the risk or pervasiveness of the 
discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the 
 
 255 Id. at 650. 
 256 Id. at 650 n.9. 
 257 Id.; see also supra Part I (discussing drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 258 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1880)). 
 259 See supra Part I (discussing the significance of Ex parte Virginia for advocates of a broad reading 
of the Section 5 power). 
 260 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. at 652. 
 263 Id. at 652–53. In support of this broad reading of Congress’s remedial power under Section 5, 
Justice Brennan cited Court decisions upholding congressional regulation in enforcing the Eighteenth 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Id. at 652 n.11. 
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state restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, the 
adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the nature and significance 
of the state interests that would be affected by the nullification of the English 
literacy requirement as applied to residents who have successfully completed 
the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school. It is not for us to review the 
congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive 
a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.264 
Second, Justice Brennan explained that the law could be upheld as a 
regulation directly targeting unconstitutional discrimination. Although the 
Court had not necessarily come to this conclusion with regard to literacy 
tests, Congress, for a number of possible reasons, could have come to a 
different conclusion.265 He again emphasized that Congress’s “specially 
informed legislative competence” must be respected by the Court, for “it was 
Congress’ prerogative to weigh these competing considerations.”266 And the 
standard was again one of sweeping deference:  
[I]t is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a 
judgment that the application of New York’s English literacy requirement to 
deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth-grade education in Puerto Rican 
schools in which the language of instruction was other than English constituted 
an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.267 
The only dissenting opinion was written by Justice Harlan, who was 
joined by Justice Stewart.268 His dissent revolves around two concerns. One 
is federalism. Regulating elections is an “area of primary state concern.”269 
To allow Congress to ban the literacy test is “tantamount to allowing the 
Fourteenth Amendment to swallow the State’s constitutionally ordained 
primary authority in this field.”270 
But it was to his other central concern involving “the separation 
between the legislative and judicial function”271 that Justice Harlan dedicated 
most of his dissent. Although he agreed that “§ 5 most certainly does give to 
the Congress wide powers in the field of devising remedial legislation to 
effectuate the Amendment’s prohibition on arbitrary state action,” Justice 
Harlan criticized the majority for “confus[ing] the issue of how much 
 
 264 Id. at 653. 
 265 Id. at 654–55. This argument had been presented in the Justice Department’s brief in the case. 
Brief for the Appellants at 30–41, Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (No. 847). 
 266 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. at 659–71 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 269 Id. at 670. 
 270 Id. at 671. 
 271 Id. at 659. 
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enforcement power Congress possesses under § 5 with the distinct issue of 
what questions are appropriate for congressional determination and what 
questions are essentially judicial in nature.”272 The definition of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, Justice Harlan argued, are for the judiciary to determine. 
When Congress acts under its enforcement power, “it is a judicial question 
whether the condition with which Congress has thus sought to deal is in truth 
an infringement of the Constitution, something that is the necessary 
prerequisite to bringing the § 5 power into play at all.”273 If one reads Section 
5 “as giving Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the 
Amendment,”274 there is the risk that Congress will “qualify” or “dilute” 
judicially defined rights.275 In response to this critique, Justice Brennan 
added his famous “ratchet” footnote, insisting that “Congress’ power under 
§ 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the 
Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute 
these guarantees.”276 
Justice Harlan allowed that the Court should give Congress some 
latitude to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights, particularly considering 
Congress’s superior fact-finding capabilities.277 But when Congress seeks 
not to set forth a factual basis for an application of its constitutional powers 
and instead makes a “legislative announcement” that a particular practice 
violates the Equal Protection Clause, then the Court should give such a 
“declaration . . . the most respectful consideration, coming as it does from a 
 
 272 Id. at 666. 
 273 Id. at 666. 
 274 Id. at 668. 
 275 Id. at 667–68. 
 276 Id. at 651 n.10 (majority opinion). Professor William Cohen memorably compared Justice 
Brennan’s Section 5 analysis to a one-way ratchet, allowing for the expansion but not the dilution of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Cohen, supra note 18. As Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel of Yale 
Law School have noted, Justice Brennan’s “ratchet” argument demonstrates that even as he was writing 
his Morgan opinion Justice Brennan was struggling with the implications of the opinion’s theory of the 
Section 5 power. Post & Siegel, supra note 15, at 39–40. Rather than just declaring the question-begging 
ratchet principle that Section 5 gives Congress the power to expand but not dilute Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, the logic of the theory of a Section 1–Section 5 gap should have led Justice Brennan to a simpler 
and more persuasive response to Justice Harlan’s concern about the possibility of Congress diluting 
constitutional rights. Justice Brennan could have recognized that judicial recognition of congressional 
authority to enforce a right in a way that diverges from judicial interpretation of that right does nothing 
to change the meaning of that very same constitutional right as a matter of judicial interpretation of 
Section 1. The Court could hold that Congress has the authority under Section 5 to pass a particular law, 
but the Court could then strike down that law for violating the very same Section 1 right that Congress 
claimed it was protecting. The same reasoning would apply in cases of conflicting rights. See Laycock, 
supra note 18, at 162–63. 
 277 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan went on to note that the passage 
of Section 4(e) lacked any relevant record of legislative findings. Id. at 669. For this reason, Justice Harlan 
rejected Justice Brennan’s argument that 4(e) could be viewed as remedial legislation. Id. 
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concurrent branch and one that is knowledgeable in matters of popular 
political participation,” but nevertheless must make its own independent 
constitutional judgment.278 Respect, therefore, must not be confused with 
blanket deference.279 
This concern with protecting judicial authority as the official interpreter 
of the Constitution’s meaning was a new theme in the Section 5 debate. Prior 
to Harlan’s Morgan dissent, it is difficult to find this separation of powers 
concern raised as a basis for limiting the scope of Section 5. The 
overwhelming theme of those who sought to minimize any potential gap 
between Section 1 and Section 5—from the seminal Civil Rights Cases 
through the debates over anti-lynching, poll tax, and public accommodations 
legislation—was a concern with expanding the power of the federal 
government at the expense of the states. Justice Harlan introduced judicial 
interpretive supremacy into this discussion. In the following years, this 
theme gained more adherents on the Court,280 culminating in the Boerne 
decision. 
 
*          *          * 
 
The 1965 Term cases are best understood as the Supreme Court’s 
opportunity to fully join and, to a significant extent, ratify the rough 
consensus over Section 5 that had emerged from the debates that had been 
taking place since the 1940s. There was nothing particularly novel about the 
Court’s interpretation of the congressional enforcement power in South 
Carolina, Harper, and Guest—or Morgan. These decisions expressed a 
constitutional common sense that had developed through the process of 
constitutional contestation of the preceding years. 
The most innovative contribution to the Section 5 debate in the 1965 
Term cases may very well have been contained in Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
Morgan. Justice Harlan introduced two novel themes to the discussion that 
 
 278 Id. at 669–70. 
 279 Id. at 670. 
 280 Justice Harlan expanded on the themes he introduced in his Morgan dissent in Oregon v. Mitchell, 
400 U.S. 112, 204–09 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See, e.g., id. at 205 
(“To allow a simple majority of Congress to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is 
therefore fundamentally out of keeping with the constitutional structure.”). In the following years, Justices 
skeptical of a broad enforcement power regularly looked to Justice Harlan’s opinions in Morgan and 
Mitchell for support. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 262 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Allowing Congress to protect constitutional rights statutorily that it has independently defined 
fundamentally alters our scheme of government.” (citing Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 205 (Harlan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part))); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 220 n.8 (1980) (Rehnquist, 
J. dissenting) (singling out Justice Harlan’s Morgan dissent as supporting a narrow, “remedial” 
understanding of the Section 5 power). 
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had developed in the ongoing constitutional discourse on Section 5: a 
concern that the exercise of Section 5 powers might infringe upon judicial 
prerogatives and a strict dichotomy between the definition of constitutional 
rights and the remedial protection of these rights. In the coming decades, 
Justice Harlan’s contributions would prove more durable than the majority’s 
conception of the Section 5 power. 
IV. THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF SECTION 5 
Between Morgan in 1966 and Boerne in 1997, the Supreme Court did 
little to clarify the provocative constitutional issues raised in Justice 
Brennan’s Morgan opinion. Some opinions indicated support for Justice 
Brennan’s more ambitious conception of the Section 5 power.281 Some 
indicated skepticism.282 Often, the Justices seemed content to avoid the 
issue.283 In this Part, I explore the Court’s marked shift from its interpretation 
in Morgan to the new rule laid down in Boerne. I conclude by examining the 
political and constitutional conditions that tend to support broad readings of 
Section 5, and then consider the function of Section 5 jurisprudence for 
American constitutionalism. 
A. The Boerne Model 
By the time the Justices considered City of Boerne v. Flores,284 the Court 
faced a starkly different political and legal landscape than did the Morgan 
 
 281 E.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (assuming that Section 5 gave Congress authority 
to regulate discriminatory impact without evidence of discriminatory intent, even if intent was required 
for a judicial finding of an equal protection violation). 
 The most expansive readings of the congressional enforcement power came in the context of judicial 
review of legislation passed under the enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. 156; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) 
(upholding a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as within the congressional enforcement power 
under the Thirteenth Amendment); id. at 440 (holding that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives 
Congress “the power . . . rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the 
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation”). It is notable that the Court’s sweeping 
assertion of congressional authority in Jones includes no reference to Morgan. See 392 U.S. at 412–444. 
This is probably explained by the fact that Justice Stewart, the author of Jones, had joined Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Morgan. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 282 E.g., EEOC, 460 U.S. at 262 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 458 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (questioning whether Section 5 authorized statute); Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 205 
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 287 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that age discrimination in voting was not a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and thus Congress could not regulate in this area). 
 283 E.g., EEOC, 460 U.S. at 260 n.6 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The ability of Congress to define 
independently protected classes is an issue that need not be resolved here . . . .”). For a summary of the 
Court’s treatment of the Section 5 power between Morgan and Boerne, see 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 936–47 (3d ed. 2000). 
 284 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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Court. In its 1965 Term, when the Court decided South Carolina, Guest, and 
Morgan, all three branches of the federal government were largely in 
agreement on the need for federal involvement to protect civil rights. 
Whether considering newly passed legislation, such as in South Carolina and 
Morgan, or efforts by the Justice Department to expand the application of 
long-standing civil rights laws, as in Guest, the Court saw the legislative and 
executive branches as allies in the larger cause of eradicating Jim Crow and 
its remnants from American life.285 After a decade of fighting the school-
desegregation battle virtually on its own, the Court was grateful to have the 
other branches assume a leadership role in the civil rights struggle.286 The 
Boerne Court, by contrast, saw Congress as a threat to its own institutional 
prerogatives. The law challenged in Boerne, unlike the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, was not a congressional effort to share the burden of a cause the Court 
had already committed itself to. Rather, it was an effort to directly refute a 
previous Court decision. While Morgan involved the question of the 
distribution of responsibility for a shared cause, Boerne involved an inter-
branch struggle for dominance in constitutional interpretation. 
At issue in Boerne was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA).287 RFRA was passed in 1993 as a direct response to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Employment Division v. Smith,288 a Free Exercise Clause 
case holding that neutral, generally applicable laws did not require a 
compelling state interest when applied to religious activities. Riding the 
wave of public criticism that met the Smith decision,289 Congress mobilized 
to pass RFRA, which reinstated the compelling interest requirement for 
generally applicable regulations that substantially burden religious activity, 
thus returning First Amendment doctrine to its pre-Smith status—a goal 
made explicit in the text of the statute.290 Congress based its authority on 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.291 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that Congress exceeded 
its Section 5 power in passing RFRA. While acknowledging those 
 
 285 See POWE, supra note 17, at 214 (“The best description of the period is that all three branches of 
government believed they were working harmoniously to tackle the nation’s problems. It was simply a 
matter of determining which institution was best-suited to handle a specific problem, and each went 
forward in its own way knowing the others were also seeking complementary results.”). 
 286 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 5–
6, 229–35 (2014); Cox, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 18, at 91. 
 287 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4). 
 288 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
 289 See McConnell, supra note 1, at 159–60. 
 290 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are-(1) to restore the compelling interest test 
as set forth in [pre-Smith cases] . . . .”). 
 291 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997). 
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precedents that emphasized the broad scope of Congress’s Section 5 
power,292 he limited the potential reach of these precedents by embracing—
and extending—the distinction between legislation that remedies 
constitutional violations and legislation that defines constitutional violations 
that Justice Harlan had introduced in his Morgan dissent293: 
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the 
suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. 
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.294 
Although the line between remedial and substantive approaches “is not easy 
to discern,” the critical criteria, for Kennedy, is the connection between the 
“injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”295 
The relationship must have “congruence and proportionality.”296 
Justice Kennedy claimed support for his position in the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s framing. He interpreted the abandonment of the 
early version of the Fourteenth Amendment—which was a straightforward 
grant of power to Congress to make laws protecting civil rights297—as a 
rejection of a broad congressional-enforcement power.298 Critics of the initial 
version came from “across the political spectrum,” Justice Kennedy noted, 
and they concluded that “[t]he proposed Amendment gave Congress too 
much legislative power at the expense of the existing constitutional 
structure.”299 The revised version of the Fourteenth Amendment, with the 
rights defined in the opening section and the congressional-enforcement 
clause moved to the fifth section, meant that “Congress’ power was no longer 
plenary but remedial.”300 Although there was almost no discussion of judicial 
independence in the framing history,301 Justice Kennedy highlighted the 
 
 292 Id. at 517 (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966), and Ex parte Virginia, 
100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1880)). 
 293 Id. at 518–19. 
 294 Id. at 519. 
 295 Id. at 519–20. 
 296 Id. at 520. 
 297 See supra Part I. 
 298 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 523–24. 
 299 Id. at 520. 
 300 Id. at 522. 
 301 Justice Kennedy located statements of two critics of the original version of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—Republican Representative Robert Hale of New York and Democratic Representative 
Andrew Rogers of New Jersey—who emphasized the importance of the courts in protecting individual 
rights. Id. at 524. He admitted, however, that the “widespread resistance” to the original proposal was 
based in federalism, not separation of powers concerns. See id. 
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issue, noting that “[t]he design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved 
significant also in maintaining the traditional separation of powers between 
Congress and the judiciary.”302 Justice Kennedy thus embraced the theme 
that Justice Harlan had pioneered in his Morgan dissent, shifting Section 5 
doctrine from a concern primarily with federal power vis-à-vis the states to 
a concern with protecting the judiciary’s exclusive role in interpreting the 
Constitution. 
Justice Kennedy supported his narrow reading of Section 5 with 
existing case law, and here he confronted Morgan: “There is language in our 
opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan which could be interpreted as 
acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the 
rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”303 But he immediately 
dismissed this as “not a necessary interpretation . . . , or even the best one.”304 
To accept the broader reading of Morgan as a valid interpretation of Section 
5, Kennedy concluded, would allow “Congress [to] define its own powers 
by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning.”305 And if this were so,  
no longer would the Constitution be “superior paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means.” It would be “on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like 
other acts, . . . alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.” Under this 
approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional 
power. Shifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and 
effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained 
in Article V.306  
Thus, Morgan was narrowed—and its vision of the Section 5 power, 
built on decades of constitutional debates inside and outside the courts, was 
dismissed. 
 
*          *          * 
 
Alongside his concern with protecting against federal overreach, Justice 
Kennedy framed Boerne’s assessment of the scope of Section 5 largely in 
terms of separation of powers and constitutional interpretive supremacy. In 
contrast, those who argued for Section 5 authority to pass anti-lynching 
legislation, to strike down school segregation, to prohibit discrimination in 
 
 302 Id. at 523–24. 
 303 Id. at 527–28 (citation omitted). 
 304 Id. at 528. Justice Kennedy justified his reading of Morgan by quoting Justice Stewart, a dissenter 
in Morgan. See id. (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 296 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
 305 Id. at 529. 
 306 Id. (citations omitted). 
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public accommodations, or to prohibit poll taxes believed that such 
legislation posed no threat to the prerogatives or the legitimacy of the courts. 
These defenders of a broad Section 5 power more often assumed the 
opposite: that when Congress responded to growing national demands on 
these issues, it would lessen demands on the Court to respond on its own and 
thereby, as Archibald Cox explained in his 1966 Harvard Law Review 
Foreword, “relieve some of the stresses to which constitutional adjudication 
is subjected when the Court is forced to take the lead in a legal revolution.”307 
Whether the Court would, in the process of reviewing a particular exercise 
of Section 5 power, reconsider its own interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was generally recognized as a distinct question. In the episodes 
described in this Article, the Court could very well have upheld an exercise 
of Section 5 power without feeling it necessary to revise its Section 1 
doctrine. This is clearly what Justice Black had in mind when he asserted 
that Section 5 provided authority to prohibit segregation in public 
accommodations or the poll tax.308 
From the Justices’ perspective, this approach was both cooperative and 
deferential. As Justice Warren made explicit in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach309 and Justice Brennan reiterated in Morgan,310 the model was 
basically the rational basis review approach the New Deal Court embraced 
regarding congressional power to regulate economic activities.311 When 
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter mused about the possibility of 
congressional Section 5 legislation desegregating schools before Brown, or 
when Justice Black expressed a willingness to uphold congressional Section 
5 legislation based on a congressional interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause that directly conflicted with his own, they were extending the same 
deference to Congress under Section 5 that they would extend under the 
commerce power. The Morgan vision of Section 5 derived from the Justices’ 
effort to balance the lessons of the constitutional battles of the 1930s (that 
 
 307 Cox, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 18, at 91. 
 308 See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text (discussing Black’s dissent in Harper). 
 309 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (“The basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the 
reserved powers of the States.”). 
 310 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966). 
 311 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 
301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Cox, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 18, at 91 (“If the Congress 
follows the lead that the Court has provided, the last Term’s opinions interpreting section 5 will prove as 
important in bespeaking national legislative authority to promote human rights as the Labor Board 
decisions of 1937 were in providing national authority to regulate the economy.” (footnote omitted)); cf. 
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129, 150 (1893) (“[T]he ultimate question is not what is the true meaning of the constitution, but 
whether legislation is sustainable or not.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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courts should grant Congress broad deference in determining the boundaries 
of federal authority) with the lessons of the civil rights era (that the federal 
government had a special role to play in protecting individual rights). 
B. Lessons from Section 5’s Forgotten Years 
What, then, were the political and legal conditions that encouraged the 
Supreme Court to embrace the robust vision of congressional authority under 
Section 5 that culminated in Morgan? The history of Section 5’s forgotten 
years suggests three interrelated factors at play. 
The first condition was the existence of a reform agenda with broad 
enough support that it might be advanced through congressional legislation 
based on the Section 5 power. This was the case with the civil rights agenda 
in the 1960s. But as the debates surrounding Congress, the Supreme Court, 
and school desegregation in the 1950s show, the actual passage of Section 5 
legislation was not a necessary condition for the Justices to articulate a broad 
understanding of Section 5.312 Hypothetical congressional action might also 
serve as the basis for debating and developing assumptions about Section 5. 
In fact, as the history of Section 5 in the 1950s and 1960s demonstrates, 
proposed or hypothesized legislation may be more effective than actual 
legislation for producing expressions of judicial support for a broad vision 
of Section 5. 
The second condition was that some or all of the members of the 
Supreme Court supported, as a matter of principle and policy, this reform 
agenda. This was clearly the case with the Court and federal civil rights 
legislation in the 1960s, and it was clearly not the case with RFRA or the 
various other pieces of national legislation that the Court struck down 
following Boerne. From its birth in Reconstruction through today, the scope 
of Section 5 rose and fell in large part because of the shifting attitudes of the 
Justices toward the laws Congress was passing. 
The third condition was that some or all of the Justices—with the 
support of other influential voices (such as Justice Department officials and 
legal commentators)—believed that judicial leadership in pushing this 
reform agenda would expend valuable institutional capital and put the 
legitimacy of the courts at risk. The Justices supported the reform agenda 
advanced, but they preferred Congress, not the Court, to lead the way. 
This third condition can be further unpacked. At least two overlapping 
bases for this concern with judicial legitimacy are possible. One is an 
institutional concern with judicial competence. This idea stems from a belief 
that courts are not well suited to deal with certain issues, and that judges lack 
 
 312 Supra Section II.C. 
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the competence to make the relevant policy analysis or that courts lack the 
capacity to implement the required reforms. Issues such as these, judges may 
conclude, are better left to legislative initiative. A concern with protecting 
the legitimacy of the courts may also stem from jurisprudential 
commitments. Ideas about what falls within the realm of legitimate judicial 
action can derive from substantive interpretive commitments about the 
nature of the Constitution and how it is interpreted. How a judge determines 
which rights are and are not protected under the Fourteenth Amendment will 
affect that judge’s assessment of the legitimacy costs of judicial leadership 
on a given issue. 
As a general matter, this third condition relies on an approach to judging 
and constitutional interpretation that can best be described as conservative—
not a label normally attached to proponents of broad Section 5 power. Some 
of the boldest visions of Section 5 authority came from Supreme Court 
Justices who were insisting upon a more institutionally cautious path for the 
Court. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson were among the most reluctant 
members of the Court in Brown, yet they were also the most interested in 
considering the possible constitutional authority for congressional action to 
desegregate schools. Justice Black’s sweeping reading of congressional 
powers under Section 5 was consistent with his uncompromising rejection 
of the liberal Justices’ interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the sit-
in cases and Harper.313 In building a commitment to a broad reading of 
Section 5, these “conservative” positions with regard to the role of the courts 
and constitutional interpretation intertwined with what was understood then 
and now as a “liberal” attitude toward congressional power—i.e., sweeping 
deference to congressional power generally, which was the constitutional 
default position in the wake of the New Deal constitutional revolution. 
Might the conditions that allowed for the development of Section 5 
power in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s return at some future point?314 Nothing 
approaching the sense of joined purpose between the branches of 
government that characterized the civil rights era has been recreated for any 
 
 313 Although evaluations of Black’s judicial legacy rarely include his views on Section 5, he, perhaps 
more than any of his colleagues, embraced the idea that the enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction 
Amendments empowered Congress to address activity that would not necessarily be held unconstitutional 
by the courts. 
 314 If the Court were to rethink its current Section 5 jurisprudence, it might involve a resurrection of 
Morgan’s broader, substantive rationale. Or, more realistically, it would involve a more indirect 
revitalization of the principle underlying Morgan, building on its narrower, remedial rationale. The Court 
could continue to accept Boerne and its dismissal of congressional authority to define constitutional rights 
while broadening its deference to Congress under Boerne’s malleable congruence-and-proportionality 
test. Such an approach could lead to a functional resurrection of a more collaborative approach to the 
congressional enforcement power without necessarily accepting the idea that Congress can act upon its 
own reading of Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
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subsequent rights-based social reform program.315 If President Obama had 
been able to get Merrick Garland approved to take Justice Scalia’s seat, or if 
the 2016 presidential election had turned out differently, we might be 
considering a reform agenda taking shape in the coming years revolving 
around protecting against discrimination based on some (currently) 
nonsuspect category, such as sexual orientation or transgender status. 
Instead, today and in the near future, the most realistic possibility for a rights-
based agenda that has broad support in society as well as among the Justices 
on the Court would likely be an issue advanced by the political Right, with 
expanded protections for property or gun rights being the most likely 
candidates.316 
But even if the stars were to align in support of some future social 
reform movement, there remains the problem of the third condition. The 
Court has come to embrace a much more robust conception of its own 
authority, a process accelerated and solidified by the bold achievements of 
the Warren Court and embraced by subsequent Courts.317 
The story of Section 5 and Brown illuminates the early stages of this 
transformation toward judicial dominance over constitutional interpretation. 
The Justices’ suggestion that Congress might be able to do what the NAACP 
wanted based on its Section 5 power reflected not only a broad view of 
Congress’s enforcement power, but also suggested a chastened vision of the 
Court. The leading instigators of this Section 5 discussion were Justices 
Frankfurter and Jackson, both devotees of the principle of judicial restraint. 
For them, the possibility of congressional action was neither a threat to the 
Court nor a separation of powers concern, but rather a way in which the Court 
could protect its institutional legitimacy. Others were less occupied by this 
hypothetical, however, and in their reservations, one can see the emerging 
argument for judicial leadership (and against congressional leadership) in 
reshaping the Fourteenth Amendment. As attractive as these Section 5 school 
 
 315 A possible exception was the women’s movement, which made significant breakthroughs in all 
three branches of the federal government in the 1970s and into the 1980s. See generally Reva B. Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto 
ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). But this movement did not produce any major Section 5 initiatives 
that would have placed pressure on existing Section 1 doctrine. By the time of United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000), striking down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, the Court clearly did not 
view itself as an ally in a shared cause of national reform on behalf of women’s rights. Rather, it assumed 
the role of a guardian for “the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the 
National Government,” id. at 620, in the face of what a majority of the Court saw as an overreaching 
Congress. 
 316 See William D. Araiza, Arming the Second Amendment—and Enforcing the Fourteenth, 
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2017) (suggesting possible federal legislation aimed at protecting Second 
Amendment rights that might be passed under Section 5). 
 317 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 1. 
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desegregation musings were to Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, the 
discussion worried the civil rights lawyers. They feared that this suggestion 
could form the basis of a rationale for the Court not to act—to declare the 
whole issue a nonjusticiable political question and wait for Congress to deal 
with the issue (as Professor Paul Freund later suggested the Justices could 
have done).318 In response, those calling on the Justices to strike down 
segregated schools went out of their way to emphasize the essential role of 
the Supreme Court in defining constitutional rights. Their goal was to keep 
pressure on the Court to act.319 In this way, calls for judicial responsibility 
easily slid into assertions of judicial interpretive supremacy. In defending 
Brown, the Court and its allies challenged the idea of extrajudicial 
constitutionalism. 
The difficulty of embracing judicial leadership while not sliding into 
embracing judicial interpretive supremacy is further demonstrated in the 
debate over the public accommodations provision of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. The bold responsibility the Supreme Court adopted for protecting civil 
rights in Brown actually seemed to hinder congressional efforts at 
constitutional interpretation in this debate. The looming shadow of Court 
doctrine constrained congressional consideration of a Section 5 basis for the 
statute and steered discussion to the commerce power, which proved a 
functional, if less than intuitive, foundation for such transformative civil 
rights policy. In the end, legislative efforts to reconsider the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment remained largely deferential to the Court’s state 
action doctrine. Due to the Southern campaign of Massive Resistance— 
which was premised on a refutation of the authority of the Supreme Court—
acceptance of the supremacy of the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution 
had become a critical fault line for the Civil Rights Movement.320 For those 
interested in expanding civil rights for African Americans, it was not a time 
for bold proclamations of legislative interpretive autonomy, even if 
expressed in support of the civil rights cause. 
For better and for worse, the constitutional order today, with the 
Supreme Court as the self-proclaimed—and largely unchallenged—ultimate 
expositor of constitutional meaning at its center, is far different from the 
Congress-centered world of Reconstruction; and it is quite different from the 
constitutional order in the 1940s and 1950s, when the Section 5 power was 
 
 318 Freund, supra note 103, at 351. 
 319 See Christopher W. Schmidt, “Freedom Comes Only from the Law”: The Debate over Law’s 
Capacity and the Making of Brown v. Board of Education, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1493, 1531–37. 
 320 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (refuting Southern resistance to Brown by asserting 
that “the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution” is “a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system”). 
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reconsidered and revitalized. Even if the first two conditions I identify above 
were again met, the third condition might be lost to history. 
CONCLUSION 
For those today who hope to encourage a less Supreme Court-centric 
constitutionalism, the history of Section 5 recounted in this Article provides 
an attractive alternative conception of the respective role of Congress and 
the Court in giving meaning to Fourteenth Amendment rights. The prevailing 
assumption of those who advocated for a broad Section 5 power in the pre-
Morgan decades was that the Court and Congress would work together in 
giving meaning to the “majestic generalities”321 of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that this cooperative approach would serve the 
institutional needs of each. This approach incorporated the lessons of the 
New Deal, when an overreaching Court threatened to undermine its own 
legitimacy by standing in the way of needed reform. It contained a healthy 
dose of institutional conservatism regarding the limits of judicial power on 
contentious issues such as civil rights. And it also incorporated certain 
assumptions, often buried but occasionally peeking through the surface, of 
the value of the democratic process as not just a threat to individual rights, 
but also a source for the elaboration and protection of these rights. 
We today may want to accept Boerne’s rejection of Morgan. There are 
valid reasons for doing so. But if we choose this path, it should not be based 
on the dismissive judgment that Morgan stands for something logically 
incoherent, aberrational, or naïve. That decision was consistent with 
prevalent assumptions of its time. The Boerne model is certainly not 
inevitable or compelled by historical experience. The history behind Morgan 
shows an alternative, a path debated and defined but never implemented. A 
better appreciation of this alternative, as this Article has sought to provide, 
should allow us to better assess the values reflected in our current Section 5 
doctrine, and to better consider where we might go in the future. 
 
 321 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947). 
